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Why Twombly Is Good Law (But Poorly Drafted) and 
 Iqbal Will Be Overturned† 
LUKE MEIER∗ 
The conventional wisdom with regard to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal is that these two cases work 
together to usher in a new era of pleading. This reading of the cases, however, is 
wrong. In reality, Twombly was a valid application of the uncontroversial 
principle that a complaint must describe the real-world events on which the suit is 
based with some degree of factual specificity. The Iqbal opinion, unfortunately, 
mangled this concept by applying it to a complaint that described the real-world 
events on which the suit was based with sufficient factual specificity. Thus, rather 
than working in conjunction with each other, the Twombly and Iqbal cases are 
actually pulling in opposite directions. This Article explores this issue. It concludes 
that this tension will ultimately be resolved in favor of the approach in Twombly. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the attempt to decipher what is required to plead a claim for relief in federal 
court after the Supreme Court’s decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly1 and 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,2 commentators have usually combined these two cases as being 
part of the same “revolution” in pleading.3 The Iqbal case is often credited for 
clearing up lingering questions regarding the scope of the “plausibility” analysis 
introduced in Twombly.4 Apart from this issue, however, Twombly and Iqbal have 
usually been discussed as a cohesive pair. They have been jointly criticized.5 
Occasionally, they have been jointly praised.6 
The tendency to view Twombly and Iqbal as a collective unit has, unfortunately, 
interfered with efforts to understand pleading doctrine. The cases have dissimilar 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 2. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
 3. See, e.g., Mark Anderson & Max Huffman, Iqbal, Twombly, and the Expected Cost 
of False Positive Error, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 1 (2010) (“Iqbal and Twombly 
introduced a new standard for pleading federal claims . . . .”); Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen 
C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 823 (2010) 
(crediting both Twombly and Iqbal for destabilizing the entire system of civil litigation); 
Scott Dodson, New Pleading, New Discovery, 109 MICH. L. REV. 53, 54 (2010) (“Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal together have changed the old notice 
pleading standard to a new ‘plausibility’ regime based primarily on pleading nonconclusory 
facts.”); Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to Dismiss 
Under Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 15, 15 (2010) (stating that in Iqbal 
and Twombly “the Supreme Court created a new standard for granting motions to dismiss 
under Rule 12(b)(6)”). But see Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: 
A Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 849 (2010) (“Iqbal screens 
lawsuits more aggressively than Twombly, and does so without adequate consideration of the 
policy stakes.”). 
 4. See Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 
473, 478–81 (2010) (explaining that the Iqbal opinion clarifies that Twombly cannot be 
limited solely to the antitrust context); The Honorable John P. Sullivan, Twombly and Iqbal: 
The Latest Retreat from Notice Pleading, 43 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 49–50 (2009) (same). 
 5. See Michael R. Huston, Note, Pleading with Congress to Resist the Urge to 
Overrule Twombly and Iqbal, 109 MICH. L. REV. 415 (2010) (documenting the widespread 
academic criticism of Twombly and Iqbal and the legislative proposals introduced in 
Congress which would “overrule” the decisions); Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to 
Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 
2 (2010) (articulating the view that “Twombly and Iqbal have destabilized both the pleading 
and the motion-to-dismiss practices” and that “important values of civil litigation are in 
jeopardy”); see also Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 
1299 (2010) (“At best, Twombly and Iqbal appear to be result-oriented decisions designed to 
terminate at the earliest possible stage lawsuits that struck the majorities as undesirable.”). 
 6. See Stephen R. Brown, Reconstructing Pleading: Twombly, Iqbal, and the Limited 
Role of the Plausibility Inquiry, 43 AKRON L. REV. 1265, 1267 (2010) (arguing that much of 
the criticism regarding Twombly and Iqbal is “unjustified”); Adam McDonell Moline, 
Nineteenth-Century Principles for Twenty-First Century Pleading, 60 EMORY L.J. 159, 159 
(2010) (arguing that Twombly and Iqbal “better reflect the original meaning of the Federal 
Rules than the caselaw the Court discarded”). 
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analytical foundations. In short, the Twombly decision can be justified as merely an 
application of preexisting principles regarding pleading; the Iqbal case, however, 
was wrongly decided and is destined to be overruled. To jointly criticize both 
opinions is to throw the baby (Twombly) out with the bathwater (Iqbal); to jointly 
praise both opinions is to miss how dirty the bath water is in which the baby is 
sitting. Until Twombly and Iqbal are decoupled and considered as separate entities, 
pleading jurisprudence will continue in a state of disarray.  
It is not necessarily surprising that academic commentators have treated 
Twombly and Iqbal as one and the same. The Court’s Iqbal opinion reads as if all 
that was required in Iqbal was a simple application of the Twombly decision. It is 
likely that the Iqbal Court even thought as much. The underlying problem is the 
Twombly opinion. 
The Twombly opinion is muddled on three critical points. All three of these 
points are necessary to an understanding of the Twombly case. The inarticulate 
manner in which these points were discussed in Twombly is largely responsible for 
the current confusion regarding pleading doctrine; it is also the source of the 
erroneous decision in Iqbal. Because of the ambiguity in the Twombly opinion, the 
Iqbal Court interpreted it in a manner that was inconsistent with prior Supreme 
Court precedent.  
First, the Twombly opinion does a poor job of pinpointing the critical defect in 
the plaintiffs’ complaint, which was the complete lack of factual specificity 
provided in the complaint regarding the event on which the defendants’ liability 
was premised.7 Scholars have often failed to appreciate that Twombly was a case 
about the factual specificity, or the lack thereof, in the plaintiffs’ complaint.8 The 
Iqbal Court appears to have made this same mistake.9 
Second, the Twombly opinion is unclear as to how the “plausibility” analysis, 
which was introduced in Twombly, relates to the question of factual specificity.10 It 
is tempting to interpret the Twombly opinion such that plausibility is a measure for 
factual specificity. Under this reading, a complaint has sufficient factual specificity 
when it includes enough factual detail to be plausible. As such, plausibility is a 
requirement that every civil complaint filed in federal court must meet. The better 
reading of Twombly, however, is that the plausibility analysis is required only when 
the factual specificity requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 (“Rule 8”) 
have not been met. Pursuant to this understanding, factual specificity serves as a 
trigger for the plausibility analysis: only when the complaint has not been drafted 
with sufficient factual specificity does the plausibility analysis become necessary. 
This reading of Twombly reconciles the case with existing pleading doctrine. 
However, under this reading, Twombly still serves as an incredibly important case 
of first impression: Twombly is the first Supreme Court opinion to determine that 
                                                                                                                 
 
 7. See infra Part II. 
 8. For instance, Professor Steinman’s influential article, Plain Pleading, does not 
include the term “factual specificity”; based on this omission and the overall focus of 
Steinman’s article, it is fair to conclude that he does not believe that the question of factual 
specificity was at the heart of Twombly and Iqbal. See generally Steinman, supra note 5. 
 9. See infra Part IV.B. 
 10. See infra Part III.C. 
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the factual specificity standard of Rule 8 had not been met, and it instructs lower 
courts on how to proceed in this event—by conducting the plausibility analysis. 
This leads to the third point on which the Twombly opinion is equally vague: 
What is the test for factual specificity that triggers the plausibility analysis? The 
Iqbal Court (as well as most commentators) focused on the portion of the Twombly 
opinion discussing the “conclusory” nature of the conspiracy allegations in that 
case.11 Thus, in Iqbal, the Court proceeded to a plausibility analysis because the 
allegations of discriminatory intent in that case were “conclusory.”12 It makes no 
sense, however, for the plausibility analysis to be triggered by the existence of 
conclusory allegations. Whether an allegation is conclusory is different than 
whether the allegation is factually specific.13 The Twombly complaint involved a 
conclusory allegation that was not factually specific;14 the Iqbal complaint, on the 
other hand, involved a conclusory allegation that was factually specific.15 By 
conflating the factual specificity of an allegation with whether that allegation is 
conclusory, the Twombly opinion occasioned the Iqbal decision in which the 
plaintiffs’ complaint was dismissed despite having been drafted with as much 
factual specificity as possible.16 
Once the confusion stemming from the jumbled Twombly opinion is sorted out, 
the Iqbal decision stands out as an eyesore within pleading jurisprudence. It is 
flatly inconsistent with Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.,17 a unanimous decision by the 
Supreme Court decided only seven years prior to Iqbal. The Swierkiewicz decision 
was not overruled, nor even mentioned, in the Iqbal opinion. In addition, the 
original understanding of Rule 8, as pronounced in Conley v. Gibson,18 would not 
have required that a plaintiff such as Iqbal even allege the defendants’ 
discriminatory intent, let alone demonstrate that allegation’s “plausibility.”  
The organization of this article is as follows: Part I provides a brief history of 
pleading theory within the United States and a reexamination of the Conley 
decision. Part II demonstrates that Twombly was a case in which the factual 
specificity of the complaint was at issue. Part III explores the different ways in 
which Twombly’s plausibility analysis might relate to factual specificity, 
concluding that plausibility is triggered only when a complaint lacks factual 
specificity. Part IV argues that the Iqbal Court’s fundamental error was to apply the 
plausibility analysis because of the existence of the conclusory allegation. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 11. See infra Part IV.B. 
 12. See id. 
 13. Infra Part IV.D. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See id. 
 17. 534 U.S. 506 (2002). 
 18. 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
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I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
A. Pleading Eras 
To best understand Twombly and Iqbal, it is helpful to briefly revisit the history 
of pleading within the United States and how the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
fit into that story. This history has been thoroughly addressed in contemporary 
scholarship19 and need not be recounted here in great detail. A cursory recap, 
however, should prove fruitful to the topics discussed in this paper. 
The pleading system inherited from English common law, and used initially by 
American courts, required a plaintiff to sue on a particular writ.20 A writ was a 
recognized legal right to a particular legal remedy under certain factual 
circumstances.21 Under the common law form of pleading, it was important that the 
complaint clearly identify the writ being sued upon.22 Moreover, each lawsuit could 
involve only one writ.23 
This system forced litigants to frame their disputes within the confines of 
established legal principles.24 But it was mostly ineffective in achieving clarity 
                                                                                                                 
 
 19. See, e.g., Kenneth S. Klein, Ashcroft v. Iqbal Crashes Rule 8 Pleading Standards on 
to Unconstitutional Shores, 88 NEB. L. REV. 261, 265–68 (2009) (detailing history of 
pleading from the common law to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Moline, supra note 
6, at 163–73 (same); Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, Rational Pleading in the 
Modern World of Civil Litigation: The Lessons and Public Policy Benefits of Twombly & 
Iqbal, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1107, 1111–21 (2010) (same); Sullivan, supra note 4, at 
8–14 (same). 
 20. See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL 
PROCEDURE § 5.1, at 252 (4th ed. 2005) (“At common law the entire procedure system was 
inextricably interwoven with what was called the writ system.”); SUZANNA SHERRY & JAY 
TIDMARSH, CIVIL PROCEDURE: ESSENTIALS 24 (2007) (“Almost all the newly independent 
states initially adopted the English system, complete with the writ and pleading 
regime . . . .”); STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 337 (7th ed. 2008) (“Early common 
law reflected great concern about whether the claim was one of the 30-some actions. . . . As 
a result, common law pleaders had to recite carefully one of the formulas (writs) recognized 
by those courts.” (emphasis in original)).  
 21. See Sullivan, supra note 4, at 8 (“Each writ developed its own procedural, factual, 
and evidentiary requirements and provided specific and unique remedies.”); Note, The Right 
to Jury Trial in Enforcement Actions Under Section 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA, 96 HARV. L. 
REV. 737, 747 (1983) (explaining that “common law writs combined both rights and 
remedies into a ‘single form of action’”). 
 22. See RICHARD D. FREER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.2 (2d ed. 2009) (explaining the 
necessity of suing on a particular writ at common law); SHERRY & TIDMARSH, supra note 20, 
at 19–20 (same). 
 23. See DAVID DUDLEY FIELD, WHAT SHALL BE DONE WITH THE PRACTICE OF THE 
COURTS? (Jan. 1, 1847), reprinted in 1 SPEECHES, ARTICLES, AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF 
DAVID DUDLEY FIELD 226, 237 (A. P. Sprague ed., 1884) (“A mistake in the form of the 
action is generally fatal to the case.”); Sullivan, supra note 4, at 9–10 (“The common law 
judges, including Blackstone, were more concerned that the correct writ was chosen than 
whether a plaintiff could recover damages for an injury.”). 
 24. See CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING § 4, at 14 (2d 
ed. 1947) (“The process of issuing writs came to be strictly limited to cases where precedents 
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between the litigants as to their competing version of the events that had led to the 
dispute. Under the common law writ-based pleadings, the factual predicate of the 
dispute (each party’s version of the “story” of the case) was a secondary concern.25 
Because the plaintiff might not have to present her version of the real, disputed 
facts in the initial writ, a party’s factual contentions could be unknown until trial.26 
As the nineteenth century proceeded, the common law writ system of pleading 
was gradually replaced by “code pleading.”27 An important event in this 
transformation was the development of New York’s “Field Code” of pleading, as 
drafted by legal reformer David Dudley Field.28 The code theory of pleading 
represented a fundamental shift in what was required from a complaint at the outset 
of a case.29 While the common law system of pleading required the plaintiff to 
identify the basis of the legal doctrine on which relief was sought, the code theory 
of pleading instead required a plaintiff to tell the “story” of the case from her 
perspective.30 
Numerous factors influenced the shift from common law writ pleading to code 
pleading,31 but the change was consistent with fundamental jurisprudential shifts 
during this time period regarding the nature of law and the role of a judge in 
deciding a case. The common law writ theory of pleading was a good fit for the 
                                                                                                                 
existed, so that a litigant had to bring his claim within the limits set by some former 
precedent.”); Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Article III and the Cause of Action, 89 IOWA L. REV. 
777, 793 (2004) (noting that common law pleading was reluctant to recognize relief for 
“novel claims”); see also SHERRY & TIDMARSH, supra note 20, at 20–21 (explaining that the 
writ system limited the types of relief that could be awarded); cf. ROBERT WYNES MILLAR, 
CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 5–6 (1952) (explaining 
the gradual trend from “rigidity to flexibility” within the history of procedure). 
 25. See YEAZELL, supra note 20, at 337 (explaining that it was necessary to include the 
allegation required for the writ sued upon but that these allegations might reveal little about 
the underlying factual dispute between the litigants). 
 26. See id. (“[L]itigants could occasionally stumble into trial having little idea what the 
contested issues would be.”); SHERRY & TIDMARSH, supra note 20, at 21 (explaining that 
under the writ system of pleading “there was almost no way for the parties to ferret out facts 
unless they paid for an investigation”). 
 27. See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, CIVIL PROCEDURE 20–21 (2d ed. 2009) (describing the 
“code pleading” reform of American pleading); RICHARD L. MARCUS, MARTIN H. REDISH, 
EWARD F. SHERMAN & JAMES E. PFANDER, CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH 118 
(5th ed. 2009) (same). 
 28. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 340 (1973) (explaining 
the development and importance of the Field Code). 
 29. See id. (“Stylistically, no greater affront to the common-law tradition can be 
imagined than the 1848 code. . . . The substance of the Field Code was almost as daring as 
its style. . . . [T]his was the death sentence of common-law pleading.”). 
 30. See CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING § 11, at 29 
(1928) (“[C]ode pleading may be referred to as fact pleading, in view of the great emphasis 
placed under the codes upon getting the facts stated.”) (emphasis in original); CHARLES 
ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, 5 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1202, at 91 
(3d ed. 2004) (“Under the codes the emphasis was placed on developing the facts through 
the pleadings.”). 
 31. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 28, at 344–46 (arguing that the pleading reform was 
supported by commercial interests desiring a more predictable procedural context for the 
resolution of disputes). 
2012] TWOMBLY AND IQBAL 715 
 
natural law conception of law, which permeated the English common law that had 
been received in America.32 Under natural law theory, the common law was 
nothing more than an application of self-evident principles that could be deduced 
from prior cases and simple logic.33 The role of a judge, then, was to ascertain the 
relevant authority and guiding principles that would control the dispute.34 This top-
down, authority-based conception of law was well served by a pleading doctrine 
that required the plaintiff to identify the controlling law at the outset. 
The emergence of code pleading coincided with a rejection of natural law 
principles in favor of a more instrumental view of the common law and the role of 
judges.35 Under this instrumental view, the common law was a product of human 
will (as opposed to natural law principles) and thus a mechanism or tool by which 
to achieve particular policy objectives.36 The role of the judge, then, was to 
understand how a specific factual dispute implicated larger policy concerns.37 
Obviously, a pleading regime that elevated the importance of the factual context of 
the dispute over legal doctrine was a natural fit with this new instrumental view of 
the law and the role of judges. It was important for judges to understand the factual 
context in order to appreciate the relevant policy issues at stake. Legal doctrine was 
less important during this time period, as judges generally felt less constrained by 
precedent and freer to craft “new” rules of decision.38 
                                                                                                                 
 
 32. See Stephen M. Feldman, From Premodern to Modern American Jurisprudence: 
The Onset of Positivism, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1387, 1397 (1997) (“American jurisprudents 
readily accepted Blackstone’s natural law orientation.”); Barbara A. Singer, The Reason of 
the Common Law, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 797, 799–807 (1983) (discussing the natural law 
foundation of English common law). 
 33. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860 
(1977) (“In short, common law doctrines were derived from natural principles of justice, 
statutes were acts of will; common law rules were discovered, statutes were made.”); id. at 4 
(“The generation of Americans who made the American Revolution had little difficulty in 
conceiving of the common law as a known and determinate body of legal doctrine.”). 
 34. See id. at 8 (“The equation of common law with a fixed, customary standard meant 
that judges conceived of their role as merely that of discovering and applying preexisting 
legal rules.”). 
 35. See id. at 16–30 (describing the emergence of an instrumental view of the common 
law during the first half of the nineteenth century). 
 36. See id. at 21–23 (explaining the process by which the instrumental view of the 
common law displaced the natural law conception of the common law). 
 37. See id. at 22–23 (portraying the emerging view among judges during this time as 
adhering to the “view that they had been given a popular charter to mold legal doctrine 
according to broad conceptions of public policy”). 
 38. See, e.g., Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. 1805) (“[O]ur decision should have in 
view the greatest possible encouragement to the destruction of an animal, so cunning and 
ruthless in his career . . . . Whatever Justinian may have thought of the matter, it must be 
recollected that his code was compiled many hundred years ago, and it would be very hard 
indeed, at the distance of so many centuries, not to have a right to establish a rule for 
ourselves . . . . [T]empora mutantur; and if men themselves change with the times, why 
should not the laws undergo an alteration?”) (Livingston, J., dissenting); see HORWITZ, supra 
note 33, at 24–26 (describing an emerging resistance to “the colonial subservience to 
precedent” and a willingness to create new rules justified on “functional terms”). 
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The discrepancy between the fact-based regime of code pleading and the 
doctrine-based regime of common law pleading can be thought of as representing 
two fundamental ways of thinking—and talking about—the law. Was Palsgraf39 a 
case about proximate cause and duty in a negligence claim? Or, was Palsgraf a 
story about an exploding package of dynamite, tipped scales, and a severely injured 
plaintiff? Both descriptions of the case are accurate and merely represent different 
ways of thinking about—and discussing—the law. The first description of Palsgraf 
describes the case in doctrinal terms, while the second describes the case in terms 
of a factual story. The difference between common law pleading and code pleading 
can be understood according to these two ways of thinking about law: common law 
pleading emphasized doctrine, while code pleading emphasized real-world facts. 
Even with the shift to a system of fact-based pleading during the instrumental 
period in American jurisprudence, however, legal doctrine never became 
unnecessary or irrelevant. Although a judge during the instrumental period might 
have been more inclined to narrowly read precedent or to create new legal rights, in 
most run-of-the-mill cases, the story told by the plaintiff would have to “fit” within 
a recognized fact pattern for which legal relief was recognized.40 Because the 
plaintiff’s complaint under code pleading was fact-driven, it was necessary to 
match the story told by the plaintiff to a recognized cause of action under existing 
law. Of course, this inquiry is always necessary in any legal system, but during the 
common law system of writ pleading, this process would not often be conducted 
solely from the initial complaint. Because the common law writ system required the 
plaintiff to plead the writ, or recognized cause of action, at the outset of the case, 
with scant attention to factual underpinnings, the process of matching facts to law 
usually occurred after the initial writ was filed by the plaintiff; usually, this was 
done through a system of back-and-forward pleading between the litigants or at 
trial.41 Under code pleading, however, with the plaintiff’s version of the facts 
included in the complaint, it was possible to do an initial screening of existing law 
                                                                                                                 
 
 39. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339 (1928).  
 40. Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 8–9 (2008) (explaining that judges 
must often consult “other sources of judgment” than “conventional legal texts” but that this 
is necessary only “occasional[ly]”). 
 41. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 30, § 1202, at 90 (“At common law there was a 
generally held belief in the efficacy of pleadings. The whole grand scheme was premised on 
the assumption that by proceeding through a maze of rigid, and often numerous, stages of 
denial, avoidance, or demurrer, eventually the dispute would be reduced to a single issue of 
law or fact that would dispose of the case.”); Charles E. Clark, The Complaint in Code 
Pleading, 35 YALE L.J. 259, 259 (1926) (“It is true that the common law declaration 
contained allegations which set forth the pleader's cause in a general way at least; but the 
emphasis under the common law system of pleading was placed, not so much on getting the 
facts on record, but rather upon forcing the opposing parties by their successive pleadings to 
arrive at a single definite issue.”). By filing a demurrer, a defendant could assert that the 
plaintiff had not pled facts that entitled the plaintiff to recovery. MARCUS ET AL., supra note 
27, at 117. But this was a risky litigation strategy for a defendant: “If defendant filed a 
general demurrer, for example, that might put the case at issue; if the demurrer were not 
sustained the plaintiff could win the case because the defendant chose the wrong point to 
fight.” Id. 
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to see if the plaintiff’s story was recognized as actionable under existing legal 
doctrine.42 
The ability of a judge to match facts to legal doctrine at the pleadings stage 
depends, in part, upon the specificity with which the plaintiff, in her complaint, has 
recounted the facts that prompted the dispute. The more specificity included by the 
plaintiff, the easier it is for a court to adjudge whether the plaintiff has a right to 
recovery under existing law.43 For instance, a complaint that describes the 
formation and breach of a contract to deliver widgets is presumptively actionable.44 
However, if the complaint more specifically describes the defendant as a thirteen-
year-old defendant, the claim is not actionable under the legal rule that minors 
cannot enter into binding contracts.45 
The question of the factual specificity required under code pleading for a 
plaintiff’s complaint is a history that has been exhaustively recounted and need not 
be replicated here.46 While it is a complicated topic, it is safe to make the general 
observation that as code pleading developed in the late nineteenth century, some 
courts began to require more and more factual specificity from the plaintiff in her 
complaint.47 
This pleading trend towards requiring more factual specificity can again be 
understood in terms of deeper jurisprudential shifts. The formalist jurisprudential 
era of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century was a reaction to the 
instrumental period in American jurisprudence.48 As with the natural law 
conception inherited from English common law, the focus during the formalist era 
again swung towards the idea of law as a top-down process in which legal 
precedent was more important.49 Although the formalist era often substituted a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 42. See Michael Moffitt, Pleadings in the Age of Settlement, 80 IND. L.J. 727, 764–65 
(2005) (describing demurrer practice under code pleading). 
 43. See YEAZELL, supra note 20, at 357 (“The more detail required, the greater the 
likelihood that a court can sort strong from weak cases at an earlier stage.”). 
 44. See Kabehie v. Zoland, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721, 728 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) 
(discussing elements of a claim for breach of contract). 
 45. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 14 (1981) (“Unless a statute provides 
otherwise, a natural person has the capacity to incur only voidable contractual duties until 
the beginning of the day before the person's eighteenth birthday.”). 
 46. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 41, at 259–70 (describing factual specificity required 
under Code pleading); Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 438 (1986) (recounting history of factual 
specificity required under Code pleading era); Moline, supra note 6, at 166–69 (same). 
 47. Courts would sometimes penalize a plaintiff by alleging facts too specifically, as 
well. See Moline, supra note 6, at 167–68 (“[J]udges perverted Field’s fact pleading into a 
doctrine of ‘ultimate facts,’ as distinguished from ‘conclusions of law’ (facts alleged too 
generally) and ‘evidentiary facts’ (facts alleged too specifically).”). 
 48. See William E. Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Movement upon Styles of 
Judicial Reasoning in Nineteenth Century America, 87 HARV. L. REV. 513, 516–20 (1974) 
(discussing many different theories as to the relationship between the instrumental period 
and the formalist period but assuming that some relationship must exist). 
 49. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 37–39 
(1960) (describing the emphasis on precedent and legal doctrine during the formalist era in 
American jurisprudence); Nelson, supra note 48, at 516 (“In talking about a shift from 
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“scientific” approach to ascertaining controlling legal authority instead of the “self-
evidence” principles of natural law,50 the effect was the same in that judges 
generally felt more constrained by precedent and less able to react to the particular 
facts of a case to achieve justice or promote particular policies.51 The trend under 
code pleading to sometimes require more specificity, then, fits with the increased 
importance of legal doctrine and precedent towards the close of the nineteenth 
century. By requiring a plaintiff to plead her case with more specificity, the 
relevant legal rules could be more quickly and accurately ascertained and applied. 
Code pleading had arisen as a reaction to the doctrine-heavy approach of 
common law pleading. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were also a reaction 
to the pleading regime of the formalist era that it ultimately replaced.52 The Federal 
Rules accepted the fact-centric approach of code pleading; both code pleading and 
the Federal Rules proceed from the same starting assumption, which is that the 
primary objective of a complaint is for the plaintiff to present her version of the 
factual predicate on which the liability of the defendant is based.53 However, the 
Federal Rules were drafted with the clear objective that less factual specificity be 
required than what had sometimes been mandated by judges under code pleading.54 
This is evident from the text of Rule 8,55 the statements of those who drafted the 
                                                                                                                 
instrumentalism to formalism . . . we are talking about a shift in the style of judicial 
reasoning in individual cases—a shift from a style in which judges explicitly asked 
themselves whether a proposed rule would promote economic growth to a style in which 
judges asked whether a proposed rule was consistent with an existing body of doctrine.”). 
 50. See C.C. LANGDELL, SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, at viii (1879) 
(“Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or doctrines. To have such a 
mastery of these as to be able to apply them with constant facility and certainty to the ever-
tangled skein of human affairs, is what constitutes a true lawyer.”); David Dudley Field, The 
Magnitude and Importance of Legal Science (Sept. 21, 1859), in 2 THE HISTORY OF LEGAL 
EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 658, 659 (Steven Sheppard ed., 1999) (“The science of 
the law embraces therefore all the rules recognized and enforced by the State . . . .”). 
 51. See LLEWELLYN, supra note 49, at 38 (describing the formalist-era momentum 
towards the idea that “the rules of law . . . decide the cases” and that policy considerations 
were “not for the courts”); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (1894) (“[J]udges do not like to discuss questions of policy, or to put a 
decision in terms upon their views as law-makers . . . .”). 
 52. See ISSACHAROFF, supra note 27, at 21 (“The Rules were also intended to resolve the 
many problems of the common law and state code approaches to the pleading process.”); 
YEAZELL, supra note 20, at 357 (“[T]he Rules seek to avoid [the problems associated with 
the factual specificity requirements under Code pleading] with their ‘short, plain statement’ 
requirement.”). 
 53. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 20, §§ 5.5–.7 at 262–67 (describing the 
relationship between common law pleading, code pleading, and pleading under the Federal 
Rules); Moline, supra note 6, at 163–76 (same). 
 54. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 30, § 1202, at 93 (“Federal civil pleadings differ 
from the ‘fact pleading’ of the codes principally in the degree of generality with which the 
elements of the claim may be stated.”). 
 55. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring only a “short and plain statement of the claim 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”); see also FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 20, 
§ 5.7, at 267 (comparing the language of Rule 8(a)(2) with the Code requirement of a 
“statement of facts constituting a cause of action”). 
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Rules,56 and also from the structure of the Rules themselves, which provided 
generous discovery provisions requiring the parties to provide relevant information 
as to the facts of the case.57  
As with the other instances of shifts in pleading theory, the change represented 
by the Federal Rules can also be understood within the context of larger trends. The 
Rules were promulgated in 1938 during the jurisprudential shift towards “legal 
realism.”58 Indeed, legal realists were a driving force behind the reform movement 
that produced the Federal Rules.59 Legal realists held different tenets and offered 
varying perspectives,60 but one underlying theme of all legal realists was an attack 
on the sanctity of case-law precedent—particularly, precedents established during 
the more conservative formalist era.61 The code pleading era had demonstrated that 
requiring a plaintiff to plead with more specificity in her complaint facilitated the 
application of legal doctrine early in a dispute.62 If less specificity was going to be 
required under the Rules, then, the application of controlling legal doctrine would 
less often be possible solely from the plaintiff’s complaint. This suited legal realists 
fine, as they generally doubted the efficacy of legal precedent in the first place and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 56. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE FEDERAL RULES, REPORT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS 
18–19 (1955) (“The intent and effect of the rules is to permit the claim to be stated in general 
terms . . . .”). 
 57. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 26–37 (describing the discovery tools available under 
the Federal Rules). 
 58. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism—Responding to Dean Pound, 
44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1222–24 (1931) (“FERMENT is abroad in the law.”); id. at 1224 
(“Speak, if you will, of a ‘realistic jurisprudence.’”); Roscoe Pound, The Call for a Realist 
Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV. 697, 697 (1931) (“Hence I approach the subject of the call 
for a realist jurisprudence . . . .”). 
 59. See SHERRY & TIDMARSH, supra note 20, 26–28 (detailing the early efforts of realist 
Roscoe Pound towards procedural reform).  
 60. Paul N. Cox, An Interpretation and (Partial) Defense of Legal Formalism, 36 IND. 
L. REV. 57, 59 (2003) (“[L]egal realism was less a coherent school of thought than a set of 
somewhat diverse impulses . . . .”). 
 61. See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 239 (1930) (“[L]aw is uncertain 
and must be uncertain.”); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 71 (Oxford Univ. Press 
11th prtg.) (1930) (“People—and they are curiously many—who think that precedent 
produces or ever did produce a certainty that did not involve matters of judgment and of 
persuasion, or who think that what I have described involves improper equivocation by the 
courts of departure from the court-ways of some golden age—such people simply do not 
know our system of precedent in which they live.”); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of 
the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 465–66 (1897) (“Behind the logical form [of a Judge’s 
decision] lies a judgment as to the relative worth and importance of competing legislative 
grounds . . . . You can give any conclusion a logical form.”); Gary Minda, The 
Jurisprudential Movements of the 1980s, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 633–34 (1989) (“As 
members of an oppositional movement, legal realists revolted against forms of so-called 
‘mechanical jurisprudence,’ namely formalism and conceptualism, which prevailed and 
dominated the judicial imagination during the so-called formalist era of American legal 
thought.” (emphasis in original)). 
 62. See, e.g., WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 30, § 1202, at 88–89 (explaining that the 
factual specificity requirements of Code pleading were motivated by multiple policy 
objectives, including the “speedy disposition of sham claims”). 
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generally viewed cases as turning on fine factual distinctions that might be 
impossible to comprehend solely from an initial complaint and before the exchange 
of information allowed for under modern discovery.63 
B. Conley v. Gibson’s Interpretation of Rule 8 
The Supreme Court’s first, and most important, interpretation of what was 
required under Rule 8 by a plaintiff in her initial complaint comes from Conley v. 
Gibson.64 The Conley case is a staple of modern pleading jurisprudence. 
Unfortunately, both courts and scholars have misinterpreted the case for decades.65 
Because of this misinterpretation, commentators and courts have sometimes 
presumed that the Federal Rules completely abolished the requirement that a 
plaintiff’s complaint provide some factual specificity regarding the events on which 
the defendant’s liability is premised.66 In reality, however, the analytical structure 
of Conley—properly understood—is based on the premise that the Federal Rules 
maintained some standard for factual specificity in a plaintiff’s complaint, albeit 
much less than what had frequently been required under code pleading. 
In Conley, black railroad employees sued their union in federal court under the 
Railway Labor Act after they were fired from employment with the railroad and 
white workers were hired to fill their positions.67 The plaintiffs alleged that the 
defendant union had discriminatorily failed to protect the fired workers in the same 
way that it had protected white union members.68 The union filed a motion to 
dismiss the complaint under, inter alia, Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim 
under Rule 8;69 the motion was granted by the district court.70 
At the Supreme Court level, the union argued that the motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim under Rule 8 was justified by two arguments.71 The first was 
that the plaintiffs had not pled their factual story with sufficient specificity.72 The 
Court rejected the union’s argument, explaining that: 
                                                                                                                 
 
 63. See, e.g., Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 153 F.2d 757, 768 (2d Cir. 1946) 
(Frank, J., concurring) (“I believe that the courts should now say forthrightly that the 
judiciary regards the ordinary employee as one who needs and will receive the special 
protection of the courts when, for a small consideration, he has given a release after an 
injury. As Mr. Justice Holmes often urged, when an important issue of social policy arises, it 
should be candidly, not evasively, articulated. In other contexts, the courts have openly 
acknowledged that the economic inequality between the ordinary employer and the ordinary 
individual employee usually means the absence of ‘free bargaining.’ I think the courts should 
do so in these employee release cases.”). 
 64. 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
 65. See infra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 66. See Conley, 355 U.S. at 41–42. 
 67. Id. at 41, 43. 
 68. Id. at 43. 
 69. See id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 46–47. 
 72. Id. at 47. 
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[T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set 
out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim. To the contrary, 
all the Rules require is a ‘short and plain statement of the claim’ that 
will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and 
the grounds on which it rests.73 
The union’s second argument was that the plaintiffs had failed to state a legal 
claim for relief because the union’s duty not to racially discriminate amongst its 
members under the Railway Labor Act ended “with the making of an agreement 
between union and employer.”74 Because the plaintiffs’ complaint alleged 
discrimination only after the formation of a bargaining agreement between the 
union and the employer, the union argued that dismissal of the complaint was 
proper.75 The Court also rejected this argument, explaining that the prohibition 
against racial discrimination under the Railway Labor Act extended to “protection 
of employee rights already secured by contract.”76 In discussing the union’s 
argument regarding whether the statutory prohibition on discrimination extended 
beyond the time at which an agreement had been reached by the union and 
employer, the Court issued the infamous “no set of facts” language: “[W]e follow, 
of course, the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to 
state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of 
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”77 
There are several important conclusions that can be drawn from the manner in 
which the Court disposed of the arguments in Conley. The first, and somewhat 
obvious, is that the two arguments asserted by the railroad were legitimate grounds 
on which to attack the validity of a complaint under Rule 8. The Court did not 
reject the two grounds put forward by the railroad because they were nonsensical or 
legally baseless; the Court rejected the railroad’s two separate grounds because 
they were not warranted in this litigation context.78 
Before exploring this point further, it is probably helpful to briefly address 
terminology. Under modern parlance, the union’s argument regarding the factual 
specificity contained in the Conley complaint was a “factual sufficiency” challenge 
to the complaint79 while the argument regarding the applicability of the Railway 
                                                                                                                 
 
 73. Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 
 74. Id. at 46. 
 75. See id.  
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 45–46 (citing Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944); Continental 
Collieries v. Shober, 130 F.2d 631 (3d Cir. 1942); Leimer v. State Mut. Life Assurance Co., 
108 F.2d 302 (8th Cir. 1940)). 
 78. See id. at 45–48 (rejecting the railroad’s arguments because they were not warranted 
under the facts of the case but not suggesting that the arguments were baseless under the 
law). 
 79. See, e.g., Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 3, at 830 (“Second, as to factual 
sufficiency, the plaintiff practically must plead facts and even some evidence.”). This 
concept is also sometimes expressed by the term “formal sufficiency.” See, e.g., THOMAS D. 
ROWE, JR., SUZANNA SHERRY & JAY TIDMARSH, CIVIL PROCEDURE 60 (2004) (using and 
explaining the term); SHERRY & TIDMARSH, supra note 20, at 111 (same); A. BENJAMIN 
SPENCER, CIVIL PROCEDURE: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 434 (2007) (same). 
722 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 87:709 
 
Labor Act was a “legal sufficiency” challenge.80 I believe this modern language is 
somewhat confusing. Both of the union’s arguments in Conley were about the legal 
sufficiency of the complaint under Rule 8. In this sense, then, distinguishing 
between “factual” and “legal” sufficiency is potentially problematic because it 
suggests that one inquiry involves a question of law while the other is a question of 
fact. To avoid the potential confusion created by the legal sufficiency and factual 
sufficiency terms, I propose two new terms for the two different types of challenges 
that were made in Conley. First, a challenge to the specificity of the story contained 
in the pleading will be termed a “factual specificity challenge.” Second, a challenge 
to the legal theory relied on by the plaintiff will be termed a “legal theory 
challenge.” Clearly distinguishing and understanding these two different types of 
challenges is of critical importance to the topics developed in this Article. 
The Supreme Court in Conley implicitly acknowledged the validity of both the 
factual specificity and legal theory challenges made by the union when it addressed 
both arguments rather than dismissing them out of hand. Of course, the notion that 
a complaint can be dismissed when it fails to allege facts that, if proven, would 
justify recovery—a legal theory challenge—is not controversial or noteworthy. 
Under each pleading era, courts have dismissed complaints when the factual story 
described in the complaint was either inconsistent with a viable legal theory of 
recovery or not compatible with a logical extension of existing law.81 
The Conley Court’s disposition of the factual specificity challenge by the 
railroad, however, is important. Recall that the Federal Rules were a reaction to the 
practice of some courts under code pleading to require the plaintiff to draft the 
complaint with detailed factual specificity.82 In Conley, the railroad was asserting 
the exact type of challenge that had so often proven successful under code pleading, 
but which the rules had been drafted to address. Was such a challenge still fertile 
ground for testing the validity of a complaint under Rule 8? 
The Court answered this issue by opining that the “decisive” response to the 
union’s factual specificity challenge was that the rules “do not require a claimant to 
set out in detail”83 the factual allegations which form the basis of the dispute. 
According to the Court, the factual specificity issue would be analyzed by whether 
the plaintiff’s complaint had provided the “defendant fair notice of what the 
plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”84 
Let us ignore, for the moment, the question of how much factual specificity is 
required to comply with the “fair notice” standard described in Conley. A more 
fundamental conclusion is possible from the Court’s “notice” standard for factual 
                                                                                                                 
 
 80. See, e.g., Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 3, at 830 (“First, as to legal sufficiency, 
the judge decides any pure issues of law in the traditional way for a Rule 12(b) (6) motion.”). 
This concept is also sometimes expressed by the term “substantive sufficiency.” See, e.g., 
ROWE, JR., supra note 79, at 60 (using and explaining the term); SPENCER, supra note 79, at 
434 (same). 
 81. See supra note 41 (discussing availability of demurrer under common law pleading); 
see generally supra text accompanying notes 40–45 (discussing dismissal of complaint 
under code pleading). 
 82. See supra notes 48–52 and accompanying text. 
 83. Conley, 355 U.S. at 47. 
 84. Id. 
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specificity: there is some standard for factual specificity which must be met in order 
to comply with the requirements of Rule 8. The Conley Court did not say that 
factual specificity was no longer required under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The Court acknowledged that the intent of the rules was to require less 
factual specificity, but it nevertheless articulated a standard for measuring factual 
specificity and concluded that the standard had been met in the case before the 
Court.85 
Unfortunately, this very basic proposition—that there is some standard for 
factual specificity required under Rule 8, albeit a more lenient standard than what 
had existed under code pleading—has sometimes been obscured by a 
misinterpretation of the Conley opinion. This misinterpretation arises from the 
Conley Court’s disposition of the union’s legal theory challenge. Before analyzing 
the underlying substantive law of the Railway Labor Act, the Court uttered the 
famous phrase: “[A] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim 
unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support 
of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”86 
The location of this phrase within the Conley opinion, in the portion discussing 
the union’s legal argument regarding the proper interpretation of the Railway Labor 
Act, makes it abundantly clear that this phrase was intended to guide a court in 
considering a legal theory challenge. A few other scholars have very recently come 
to the same realization;87 probably, like me, they were forced to reexamine Conley 
in their efforts to make sense of the Court’s retirement of this language in Twombly. 
Previously, however, commentators had often mistakenly assumed that the “no set 
of facts” language governed the factual specificity analysis.88 Having thus erred, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 85. Other commentators have interpreted Conley in a similar manner. See WRIGHT & 
MILLER, supra note 30, § 1202, at 94 (“Thus, the Court [in Conley] recognized . . . that [Rule 
8] does contemplate the statement of circumstances, occurrences, and events in support of 
the claim presented.”). 
 86. Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–46. 
 87. See Has the Supreme Court Limited Americans’ Access to Courts?: Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 7–9 (2009) (statement of Stephen B. Burbank, 
David Berger Professor for the Administration of Justice, University of Pennsylvania Law 
School) (concluding that Conley’s “no set of facts language” related to “legal sufficiency”); 
Emily M. Sherwin, The Story of Conley: Precedent by Accident, in CIVIL PROCEDURE 
STORIES 281, 301 (Kevin Clermont ed., 2004) (same); Wendy Gerwick Couture, Conley v. 
Gibson’s “No Set of Facts” Test: Neither Cancer Nor Cure, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. PENN 
STATIM 19, 19 (2010) (same); Bradley Scott Shannon, I Have Federal Pleading All Figured 
Out, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 453, 455–56 (2010) (same). 
 88. See, e.g., Charles B. Campbell, A “Plausible” Showing After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly, 9 NEV. L.J. 1, 21 (2008) (discussing Conley’s “no set of facts” language as going 
towards the factual specificity requirements of Rule 8); Yoichiro Hamabe, Functions of Rule 
12(b)(6) in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: A Categorization Approach, 15 CAMPBELL 
L. REV. 119, 164 (1993) (explaining the view that Conley’s “no set of facts” language can be 
interpreted such that “Rule 12(b)(6) can perform virtually no factual interception function”). 
Other commentators have made a similar error in interpreting Conley’s “no set of facts” 
language by failing to distinguish between the factual specificity and legal theory inquiry. 
See Couture, supra note 87, at 28 n.62 (“Subsequent courts and commentators have 
contributed to the confusion between the ‘no set of facts’ legal sufficiency test and the ‘fair 
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scholars presumed that the Conley “no set of facts” language eviscerated any 
factual specificity analysis of a plaintiff’s complaint. For example, numerous 
scholars have uttered phrases similar to the following: “Literal compliance with 
Conley v. Gibson could consist simply of giving the names of the plaintiff and the 
defendant, and asking for judgment.”89 This conclusion is wrong because it ignores 
the factual specificity requirements of Rule 8. The “notice pleading” test for factual 
specificity established under Conley was obviously intended to be a more lenient 
approach to factual specificity than what had existed under code pleading, but, as 
discussed above, it is clear that a plaintiff’s complaint must tell a story with at least 
some factual “meat” or detail. 
To be fair to those who have had misinterpreted Conley’s “no set of facts” 
language as going towards factual specificity, some of the blame for this confusion 
should be attributed to the Conley opinion, which was not a model of clarity. First, 
the Conley opinion was not as clear as it could have been in separating out the 
different types of challenges that were being made to the complaint. Although the 
Court responded to both the factual specificity and legal theory challenges made by 
the union, it lumped them together in the Conley opinion as “respondents’ final 
ground.”90 The union had asserted two other arguments in support of the district 
court’s dismissal of the complaint—one based on subject matter jurisdiction and 
one based on the failure to join an indispensable party. Thus, the Court was 
technically correct to group the union’s factual specificity and legal theory 
challenges together, because both challenges attacked the legal sufficiency of the 
pleading under Rule 8. The Court could have been more blatant, however, in 
distinguishing between the two different methods for demonstrating that a 
complaint fails to state a claim under Rule 8.  
Second, in articulating the “no set of facts” standard, the Court again failed to 
carefully identify the standard as going to the legal theory challenge only. The 
Court stated that a “complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim 
unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts.”91 To 
clarify that the standard being described went to a legal theory challenge, the Court 
should have stated that “a complaint should not be dismissed [because the 
plaintiff’s legal theory is without merit] unless it appears beyond doubt that the 
plaintiff can prove no set of facts.” As written, the Court’s phrasing gives the 
appearance that the “no set of facts” language is an all-encompassing standard for 
determining a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge to a complaint. Finally, the Conley “no set of 
facts” language further obfuscates the issue by asking what the plaintiff “can 
prove.”92 This tends to suggest that an examination of the likely truth of the facts 
that have been pled by the plaintiff is appropriate at the pleadings stage. Of course, 
                                                                                                                 
notice’ factual sufficiency test by conflating the two standards and treating them as 
synonymous.”). 
 89. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., From Whom No Secrets Are Hid, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1665, 
1685 (1998); see also FLEMING JAMES, JR., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & JOHN LEUBSDORF, 
CIVIL PROCEDURE § 3.6, at 190 (5th ed. 2001) (concluding the same regarding Conley’s “no 
set of facts” language); Miller, supra note 5, at 99 (reasoning that “literal application” of 
Conley’s “no set of facts” language “seems unworkable”). 
 90. See Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–46. 
 91. Id. at 45. 
 92. Id. 
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this is flatly wrong. The critical question at the pleadings stage is not what will 
ultimately be proven but instead what has been alleged by the plaintiff.93 
As mentioned above, a few other scholars have recently recognized that the “no 
set of facts” language in Conley was used in discussing the legal theory rather than 
factual specificity challenge in that case.94 The full import of this realization, 
however, has not yet been fully explored. Recognizing that the “no set of facts” 
language was intended to apply to a legal theory challenge analysis allows certain 
insights to be reached about the nature of both a legal theory challenge and a 
factual specificity challenge under Rule 8. 
The first insight relates to the analysis required for a legal theory challenge. In 
analyzing whether the facts alleged by the plaintiff in the complaint are actionable 
under legal doctrine, the “no set of facts” language from Conley instructs district 
courts on how to proceed when necessary facts are either missing from the 
complaint or are ambiguously described. District courts are to “fill in the gaps” 
such that the facts necessary for asserting a viable legal claim are assumed in favor 
of the plaintiff as long as those assumed facts are not inconsistent with what has 
been actually pled by the plaintiff. Thus, if the cause of action in consideration 
requires A, B, C, and D, but plaintiff has pled only A, C, and D, Conley’s “no set of 
facts” test requires that B be assumed so long as B is not inconsistent with the 
factual story told in the plaintiff’s complaint. Thus, only in scenarios in which the 
plaintiff has pled A, C, D, and not B could the district court dismiss based on a 
substantive legal validity challenge. Stated differently, the “no set of facts” 
language instructs courts not to dismiss a complaint pursuant to a legal theory 
challenge unless it is clear on the face of the complaint that recovery is prohibited. 
The second insight involves the “notice” standard for factual specificity adopted 
in Conley. By instructing district courts to fill gaps in a plaintiff’s factual story 
when necessary for adjudging the substantive legal merit of the plaintiff’s claim, 
considerable light is shed on the standard under Rule 8 for the factual specificity 
that is necessary to state a claim. The Conley “no set of facts” language 
contemplates scenarios in which a complaint can survive a factual specificity 
challenge even though the facts necessary to state a viable legal claim are omitted 
or ambiguous. There is no reason for a district court, in considering the viability of 
the plaintiff’s legal theory, to assume facts in order to perform this analysis if the 
complaint is nevertheless deficient because it has not stated the facts with sufficient 
specificity. To draw on the analogy in the above paragraph, if a plaintiff’s 
complaint alleging only A, C, and D fails to state a claim because of a lack of 
factual specificity, there is no reason to proceed to the question of how to judge the 
validity of the plaintiff’s legal theory in light of the missing B allegation. The 
district court could dismiss the complaint, or give the plaintiff an opportunity to 
amend, but “filling in the gap” in favor of the plaintiff would be unnecessary. 
This understanding of Conley, in which a plaintiff is not always required to 
plead all of the facts that will ultimately need to be proven in order to recover from 
the defendant, is confirmed by the Court’s citation to a trio of appellate court 
                                                                                                                 
 
 93. See, e.g., Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969) (“For the purposes of a 
motion to dismiss, the material allegations of the complaint are taken as admitted.”). 
 94. See supra note 80. 
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decisions, including the celebrated case of Dioguardi v. Durning.95 The Dioguardi 
case was written by Judge Charles Clark,96 who was the principal architect of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.97 The Dioguardi case involved a “home drawn” 
complaint that told a somewhat ambiguous story about bottles of tonics which had 
been sold at a public auction.98 For instance, the complaint “does not make wholly 
clear”99 how the tonics had come into the defendant’s possession. The district court 
had granted the defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim under Rule 8.100 In reversing the dismissal, Judge Clark admonished the 
district court for “judicial haste which in the long run makes waste.”101 Although 
Judge Clark’s opinion acknowledged the ambiguities in the plaintiff’s factual 
story,102 he emphasized that factual specificity under the rules did not require the 
plaintiff to plead every fact which would ultimately be necessary under existing 
legal doctrine for recovery: “Under the new rules of civil procedure, there is no 
pleading requirement of stating ‘facts sufficient to constitute a cause of 
action,’ . . . .”103 
Moreover, in some of his nonjudicial opinions, Clark again expressed the view 
that a plaintiff’s complaint need not allege all of the facts that will ultimately need 
to be proven for the plaintiff to recover. Writing in 1948 about the “notice 
pleading” standard that would eventually be associated with the newly drafted 
Federal Rules, Clark stated: “The prevailing idea at the present time seems to be 
that notice should be given of all the operative facts going to make up the plaintiff’s 
cause of action, except, of course, those which are presumed or may properly come 
from the other side.”104 Later in the same book, Clark similarly opined: “[C]ertain 
matters of the kind which the law will conclude from the other facts pleaded, or of 
which the court has judicial knowledge, or which lie in the knowledge more of the 
defendant than the plaintiff, need not be set forth even though they are material 
operative facts.”105 
                                                                                                                 
 
 95. 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944). 
 96. See generally id. 
 97. See generally Charles E. Clark, Pleading Under the Federal Rules, 12 WYO. L.J. 
177 (1958).  
 98. See Dioguardi, 139 F.2d at 774. 
 99. Id.  
 100. Id.  
 101. Id. at 774–75. 
 102. See id. at 775 (describing the complaint as “inartistically” drafted). 
 103. Id.; see also id. at 774. (“We think that, however inartistically they may be stated, 
the plaintiff has disclosed his claims that the collector has converted or otherwise done away 
with two of his cases of medicinal tonics and has sold the rest in a manner incompatible with 
the public auction he had announced . . . .”). Judge Clark’s opinion in Dioguardi v. Durning 
was partly the impetus for a resolution which was adopted at the Ninth Circuit Judicial 
Conference in 1952 that proposed amending Rule 8(a)(2) to read as follows: “[A] short and 
plain statement of the claim, showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, which statement 
shall contain the facts constituting a cause of action.” See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 30, 
§ 1216, at 239. This proposal was referred to the Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules, 
where it was rejected. See id. 
 104. Clark, supra note 41, at 271. 
 105. Id. at 275. 
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The Conley Court’s citation to Clark’s Dioguardi opinion is telling not only 
because of the ideas expressed by Clark in that opinion but also because of the 
views that Clark had expressed in other contexts about the rules which he 
fathered.106 Moreover, Clark was not alone in his view; other commentators 
expressed the same view during this time.107 
Conley, properly understood, stands for the proposition that a plaintiff can meet 
the notice test for factual specificity even though factual allegations that are 
necessary to support a legal right to recovery are missing.108 Factual specificity is 
governed by the notice standard, and although increased specificity will usually 
assist a judge in determining the relevant law governing the case, this is not a 
purpose attributed to the factual specificity analysis. All of the factual allegations 
necessary to state a cause of action need not be pled. 
Why does this interpretation of Conley matter in trying to understand Twombly 
and Iqbal? After all, the Court retired the misunderstood “no set of facts” language 
in Twombly.109 Moreover, leading commentators have identified confusion in the 
courts as to whether all the facts necessary to state a claim for relief must be alleged 
in a complaint.110 Thus, it seems not all lower federal courts have interpreted 
Conley in the manner suggested herein.  
A proper understanding of Conley is important because it demonstrates the 
dramatic drift in pleading jurisprudence from Conley to Iqbal and undermines the 
legitimacy of the decision reached by the Court in Iqbal. Later in this Article, after 
discussing the Iqbal case, I will argue that the allegation of discriminatory intent in 
Iqbal was the exact type of factual allegation that the Conley Court (and 
commentators such as Clark) believed need not be included in a complaint. Thus, 
according to the Conley Court, the plaintiff would not have needed to even include 
                                                                                                                 
 
 106. Judge Clark was also generally supportive of the decision reached by the Court in 
Conley, although he expressed some reservations about the term “notice pleading.” See 
Clark, supra note 97, at 181 (speaking in a supportive manner of the Conley decision but 
describing some of the disadvantages of the term “notice pleading”). 
 107. See, e.g., MILLAR, supra note 24, at 190–94 (considering the issue and concluding 
that all of the factual elements of a cause of action need not be alleged in order to give notice 
to the defendant); see also WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 30, § 1216, at 214–20 (“A reading 
of Garcia, Conley, Swierkiewicz, and a host of other cases . . . suggests that the 
complaint . . . need not state with precision all of the elements that are necessary to give rise 
to a legal basis for recovery as long as fair notice of the action is provided to the opposing 
party.”). 
 108. But see WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 30, § 1216, at 212 (“Neither is the Supreme 
Court’s oft-quoted decision in Conley v. Gibson clear on whether all the elements of a prima 
facie case or cause of action must be stated [in a complaint].”). 
 109. See Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. 544, 563 (2007). 
 110. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 30, § 1216, at 211 (“The confusion that existed 
in the years following the adoption of the federal rules as to whether a claim for relief must 
state a ‘cause of action’ is typified by Garcia v. Hilton Hotels International, Inc. . . . .”); see 
also 2 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 8.04[1a][a] (3d ed. 2011) 
(“[S]ome courts attempted to frame a pleading standard based on the elements of a claim 
rather than on the fair notice standard. These courts stated that a complaint had to contain 
either direct or inferential allegations with respect to all material elements necessary to 
sustain recovery under some viable cause of action.”). 
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an allegation of the defendants’ discriminatory intent, yet the Iqbal Court dismissed 
the plaintiff’s complaint because it did not find this allegation to be plausible.111 
For a rule that has not been changed in the period between Conley and Iqbal, the 
shift from “you don’t need to allege it” to “you do need to allege it and you need to 
show that it is plausible” is quite dramatic.112  
II. RECOGNIZING TWOMBLY AS A FACTUAL SPECIFICITY CASE 
If the history of pleading and the Conley opinion recognize two different 
manners of challenging the sufficiency of a complaint113—factual specificity and 
legal theory—the next step in understanding the Twombly and Iqbal cases is to 
recognize that Twombly was a case about the factual specificity of the plaintiffs’ 
complaint. Upon reflection, this conclusion is somewhat obvious. Nevertheless, in 
the confusion created by the introduction of the plausibility analysis, this somewhat 
simple proposition has sometimes been lost in the shuffle.114 For instance, even 
Professor Adam Steinman’s brilliant article, The Pleading Problem, which I 
consider to be the most insightful article to date on Twombly and Iqbal and which 
will be discussed favorably below, does not pinpoint factual specificity (or the lack 
thereof) as the underlying problem in Twombly.115 Recognizing Twombly as a case 
about the factual specificity of the complaint, however, is necessary to a proper 
understanding of both Twombly and Iqbal. 
The Twombly litigation was instigated against major telecommunications 
providers as a class action on behalf of all “subscribers of local telephone and/or 
high speed internet services . . . from February 8, 1996 to present.”116 The class 
asserted causes of action under section 1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits 
“[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in 
                                                                                                                 
 
 111. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949–50 (2009). 
 112. See Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter 
Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 557 (2010) (noting that Rule 8(a)(2) has been 
unchanged since the rules were adopted in 1938). 
 113. See Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss Become 
(Disguised) Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 61, 61 (2007) (“The present 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow a plaintiff’s case to be attacked either for its legal or 
factual insufficiency.”). 
 114. Some commentators who have focused on this question have mistakenly identified 
Twombly as a case involving a legal theory challenge rather than a factual specificity 
challenge. See Nicholas Tymoczko, Note, Between the Possible and the Probable: Defining 
the Plausibility Standard After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 94 
MINN. L. REV. 505, 530–31 (2009) (concluding that Twombly did not involve the “amount of 
detail required by Rule 8(a)(2)” but rather the “legal merit” of the complaint). But see 
Schwartz & Appel, supra note 19, at 1127 (“The determination of plausibility, of course, 
depends on the factual specificity of a complaint.”). 
 115. See generally Steinman, supra note 5.  
 116. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 550 (quoting Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint 
at ¶ 53, Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (No. 02 CIV. 
10220)). 
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restraint of trade or commerce”117 The complaint alleged that the defendants had 
entered into an illegal conspiracy:  
Plaintiffs allege upon information and belief that [the defendants] have 
entered into a contract, combination or conspiracy to prevent 
competitive entry in their respective local telephone and/or high speed 
internet services markets and have agreed not to compete with one 
another and otherwise allocated customers and markets to one 
another.118  
In addition to this generic allegation of a conspiracy, however, the complaint 
recounted in great detail the parallel business conduct of the defendants.119 
Although independent parallel conduct is not itself illegal, previous cases had 
established that the existence of parallel conduct was probative as to whether an 
illegal conspiracy or agreement had actually taken place.120 
At the trial court level, the defendants brought a motion to dismiss the complaint 
under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules on the theory that the plaintiffs had failed 
to state a claim as required under Rule 8.121 The district court granted the motion to 
dismiss;122 and the Supreme Court eventually upheld the decision of the district 
court.123 
The best way to demonstrate that Twombly is, at heart, a case about factual 
specificity is to imagine how the Twombly litigation would have unfolded had the 
plaintiffs’ complaint included the following allegations: 
1. On February 6, 1996, all of the defendants named in this 
lawsuit met at the Marriot Hotel in Waco, Texas. 
2. During this meeting, defendants entered into an agreement to 
engage in parallel business behavior. 
3. The agreement was memorialized in a document that was 
drafted on the evening of February 16, although no formal 
contract was ever drafted. 
Assuming that this factually specific hypothetical complaint would have survived 
past the Twombly defendants’ motion to dismiss (and I believe this assumption is 
beyond assailment),124 the precise issue raised by the Twombly litigation can be 
                                                                                                                 
 
 117. Id. (quoting Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006)). 
 118. Id. at 551 (quoting ¶ 51 of the plaintiffs’ complaint). 
 119. See id. at 550–51. 
 120. See id. at 556. 
 121. See Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174, 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 122. See id. 
 123. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 
 124. See, e.g., Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers’ Ass’n v. United States, 234 U.S. 
600, 611–12 (1914) (explaining that direct evidence is usually unavailable in a conspiracy 
case but also clearly implying that direct evidence is sufficient to establish a conspiracy); 
Skye M. McQueen, The Summary Judgment Standard in Antitrust Conspiracy Cases and In 
re Travel Agency Commission Antitrust Litigation, 62 J. AIR L. & COM. 1155, 1192 (1997) 
(concluding that direct evidence will usually be sufficient to create a reasonable inference of 
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pinpointed. The difference between this hypothetical complaint and the “bare 
assertion of conspiracy” in the actual Twombly complaint is, of course, the level of 
factual specificity with which the allegation of conspiracy or agreement is made. 
As the Court explained in the Twombly opinion, the “bare assertion of 
conspiracy”125 in the actual Twombly complaint was bereft of any mention of the 
“specific time, place, or person involved in the alleged conspiracies.”126 The 
hypothetical complaint fills this void by providing factual specificity as to when, 
where, how, and by whom the agreement was perfected. 
The problem with the Twombly opinion is that it is not as explicit as it could 
have been in recognizing factual specificity as the underlying problem with the 
plaintiffs’ complaint. The opinion discusses factual specificity at various places in 
the opinion. The opinion cites the Conley notice test127 for factual specificity and 
affirms that a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations.”128 The 
majority admonishes the dissent for “suggesting that the Federal Rules somehow 
dispensed with the pleading of facts altogether.”129 And the dissenting opinion by 
Justice Stevens notes that “this is a case in which there is no dispute about the 
substantive law.”130  
At no point in Twombly, however, does the Court clearly pronounce that it is 
revisiting the ancient question of the factual specificity necessary for a plaintiff’s 
complaint. The closest the opinion comes in this regard is the following: “This case 
presents the antecedent question of what a plaintiff must plead in order to state a 
claim under § 1 of the Sherman Act.”131 Even here, though, the Court fails to 
precisely identify that the “antecedent question”132 regarding the plaintiff’s 
complaint was the lack of factual specificity with which the alleged conspiracy or 
agreement was described. The opinions by both the district court and the Second 
Circuit in the Twombly litigation fall into this same pattern: both courts mention 
factual specificity and the standards for measuring factual specificity, but neither 
directly pinpoints factual specificity as the underlying problem with the plaintiffs’ 
complaint.133 
The Court’s failure to clearly identify the factual specificity issue in Twombly is 
itself problematic, but this problem is made worse by the fact that the Court’s 
analysis of the factual specificity of the Twombly complaint is hidden in the 
opinion. The Court’s observation that the Twombly complaint “mentioned no 
specific time, place, or person involved in the alleged conspiracies” is buried in 
footnote ten of the opinion.134 And, even here, the Court’s discussion is somewhat 
muddled. The Court contrasts the “lack of notice” provided by the “bare 
                                                                                                                 
a conspiracy). 
 125. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.  
 126. Id. at 565 n.10. 
 127. See id. at 561. 
 128. Id. at 555. 
 129. Id. at 555 n.3 (citing Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 130. Id. at 571 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 131. Id. at 554–55. 
 132. Id. 
 133. See id. at 544; see generally Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 425 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 
2005); Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 134. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 565 n.10. 
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allegations” in the Twombly complaint with that provided by Form 9 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, the model form for pleading negligence.135 But in the 
same footnote, the Court suggests that the Twombly complaint has met the notice 
standard required by Rule 8 by comparing the actual Twombly complaint to one 
which “had not explained that the claim of agreement rested on the parallel conduct 
described.”136  
Adding to the ambiguity in the Twombly opinion is the Court’s extensive 
discussion, and ultimate retirement, of Conley’s “no set of facts” language.137 As 
recounted above, this language was originally intended to guide a court in 
considering a legal theory challenge to a complaint.138 Because the critical question 
in Twombly was the factual specificity with which the complaint had been drafted, 
Conley’s “no set of facts” language was not relevant to the analysis. Nevertheless, 
the Court devoted a considerable portion of the Twombly opinion to Conley’s “no 
set of facts” language, ultimately concluding that the language should be retired. 
Because this language had often been misinterpreted as going towards the factual 
specificity question, and because commentators who made this mistake then 
presumed that there was no standard for factual specificity under the rules, there 
was a valid reason for the Court to retire the “no set of facts” language in Twombly. 
The Twombly opinion, however, is ambiguous as to whether it is retiring Conley’s 
“no set of facts” language because the language has been misinterpreted (by 
mistakenly addressing factual specificity) or because the language has been 
interpreted correctly (as actually going towards factual specificity) but that the 
conclusion that follows from this interpretation is not sound.139 In other words, it is 
not clear whether the Court retired Conley’s “no set of facts” language because it 
had been misunderstood by other courts and commentators or because the Court 
itself shared in this misunderstanding. At certain points in the opinion, the Court 
writes as if it is retiring the language because everybody else has misunderstood the 
language.140 At other points in the opinion, however, the Court seems to share in 
the erroneous conclusion that the “no set of facts” language was intended to govern 
the question of factual specificity.141 Regardless of the reason why Conley’s “no set 
                                                                                                                 
 
 135. See id.  
 136. Id. 
 137. See id. at 561–63. 
 138. See supra notes 80–84 and accompanying text. 
 139. Compare CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, 20 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE: FEDERAL PRACTICE DESKBOOK § 72 (2002) (“Justice Souter carefully noted that 
Conley itself was not being overturned; it was the lower courts that had taken the ‘no set of 
facts’ language out of context.”), with A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. 
L. REV. 431, 445–46 (2008) (“The problem with [Twombly] . . . is that it significantly raises 
the pleading bar beyond where Conley had placed it long ago.”), and Robert E. Shapiro, 
Requiescat in Pace, 34 LITIGATION, 67, 68 (2007) (arguing that Twombly “did not just 
overrule Conley, it seems to overrule notice pleading itself”). 
 140. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562 (“[T]here is no need to pile up further citations to 
show that Conley’s ‘no set of facts’ language has been questioned, criticized, and explained 
away long enough.”). 
 141. For instance, the Court states that under “a focused and literal reading of Conley’s 
‘no set of facts’ [language], a wholly conclusory statement of claim would survive a motion 
to dismiss whenever the pleadings left open the possibility that a plaintiff might later 
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of facts” test was retired, the manner in which the Twombly Court discussed the 
issue further obscured the basic point that the underlying problem with the 
Twombly complaint was the lack of factual specificity in describing the alleged 
agreement amongst the defendants. 
Considering all of the static in the Twombly opinion, it is not surprising that it 
has largely gone unnoticed that Twombly was primarily a case about the factual 
specificity in the complaint. This conclusion is clear, however, assuming that the 
hypothetical complaint discussed above (in which an agreement is described as 
having taken place in Waco, Texas on February 16, 1996, at the Marriot Hotel) 
would not have been dismissed in Twombly. This Article will proceed upon that 
assumption. 
The most common alternative to the view that Twombly was, at heart, about 
factual specificity is that the Court’s plausibility analysis is a completely new 
metric by which to judge the sufficiency of a complaint under Rule 8 and that this 
analysis is completely independent from the traditional inquiries of factual 
specificity and legal theory.142 I find this alternative too bizarre to be plausible. The 
notion that the Supreme Court would introduce a completely new requirement—
plausibility—decades after the promulgation of Rule 8 contradicts the tone of the 
Twombly opinion itself. Granted, Twombly does retire the misunderstood language 
from Conley, and in certain portions of the Twombly opinion, the Court writes 
about the plausibility analysis as if it is a completely new requirement under 
Rule 8.143 Nevertheless, broadly speaking, the Twombly opinion is not written as a 
revolt against established precedent and pleading principles. Instead, the Court’s 
existing case law on pleading is regularly cited in the opinion, as if everything the 
Court is saying in Twombly is consistent with what it has said before.144 The tone of 
the opinion is reverent, not revolutionary. 
The better explanation, recounted above, is that Twombly was, at heart, about 
factual specificity. Nevertheless, the plausibility analysis used by the Court in 
Twombly cannot be ignored. If Twombly was ultimately about the factual 
                                                                                                                 
establish some ‘set of [undisclosed] facts’ to support recovery.” Id. at 561. This is similar to 
the claims made by some academics that “[l]iteral compliance with Conley v. Gibson could 
consist simply of giving the names of the plaintiff and the defendant, and asking for 
judgment.” Hazard, supra note 89, at 1685. In fact, the Court even cites to some of the 
academics who have asserted this conclusion based on the mistaken assumption that 
Conley’s “no set of facts” language governs the factual specificity question. See Twombly, 
550 U.S. at 562 (citing, among others, Professor Hazard). 
 142. See, e.g., Shannon, supra note 87, at 475 & n.91 (noting that “[t]he final way [in 
addition to factual specificity and legal theory] in which an action may be dismissed for 
failure to state a claim is insufficiency of proof,” but later qualifying this statement by 
acknowledging that insufficiency of proof is not “actually . . . per se” a separate grounds for 
dismissal (emphasis in original)). 
 143. See, e.g., Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (“The need at the pleading stage for allegations 
plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with) agreement reflects the threshold 
requirement of Rule 8(a)(2) that the ‘plain statement’ possess enough heft to ‘show that the 
pleader is entitled to relief.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Rule 8)). 
 144. See id. at 555 (citing Conley, 355 U.S. 41, 47); id. at 555–56 (citing Swierkiewicz v. 
Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 n.1 (2002), and Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 
(1989)); id. at 557 (citing Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005)).  
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specificity with which the plaintiff’s complaint had been drafted, it is necessary to 
establish a link between factual specificity and plausibility. 
III. LINKING FACTUAL SPECIFICITY TO THE PLAUSIBILITY ANALYSIS: WHEN IS THE 
PLAUSIBILITY ANALYSIS REQUIRED UNDER TWOMBLY? 
If factual specificity was the core of the problem with the complaint in 
Twombly, it is then necessary to determine how the issue of factual specificity 
relates to the infamous plausibility analysis that was introduced and employed by 
the Court in Twombly. In short, what does plausibility have to do with factual 
specificity? The answer to this question is of utmost importance. Once the 
relationship between factual specificity and plausibility is understood, it is possible 
to determine whether the plausibility analysis is required in all civil cases or 
whether it is required less frequently. Knowing when to apply the plausibility 
analysis is impossible unless the relationship between plausibility and factual 
specificity is understood. 
There are two possible ways to think about the relationship between factual 
specificity and plausibility. The first is that the plausibility analysis serves as a 
proxy for answering the question of factual specificity.145 Under this theory, the 
question of whether a complaint has been drafted with the requisite factual 
specificity is answered by considering whether enough factual detail has been 
provided such that the plaintiff’s story is plausible. Thus, the plausibility analysis is 
a tool by which the factual specificity of a complaint is measured. 
The second way in which the relationship between factual specificity and 
plausibility can be explained is dramatically different. Pursuant to this 
understanding, the plausibility analysis is only triggered when the complaint has 
failed the test for factual specificity.146 The plausibility analysis is not a measure for 
whether the complaint has been drafted with sufficient factual specificity; it is 
instead an analysis that is performed only after the separate specificity analysis has 
been conducted. Plausibility is a by-product of the factual specificity question, but 
it does not answer the factual specificity question. 
The two different theories as to the relationship between factual specificity and 
plausibility each require a different conclusion as to when the plausibility analysis 
is necessary. Under the first theory, in which plausibility is a measure of the 
complaint’s factual specificity, the plausibility test is required for every civil 
complaint filed in federal court.147 Most commentators have adopted this 
understanding as to when plausibility is required. Under the second theory, 
however, the plausibility analysis is much less prevalent: because the plausibility 
analysis is triggered only by an independent defect in the complaint, in many 
(indeed, probably most) cases the plausibility analysis will be unnecessary. This 
perspective has gained traction recently, spurred by Professor Steinman’s recent 
article in the Stanford Law Review. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 145. See infra Part III.A. 
 146. See infra Part III.B. 
 147. See, e.g., Anderson & Huffman, supra note 3, at 4 (“Because the plausibility 
standard controls access to litigation in every civil action in federal court, piercing the murk 
of the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard is crucial.”). 
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Unfortunately, similar to the failure of the Twombly opinion to identify factual 
specificity as the underlying problem in the complaint, the Twombly opinion is 
somewhat ambiguous as to the relationship between plausibility and factual 
specificity. The Twombly opinion never specifically addresses how the newly 
introduced plausibility analysis relates to the question of factual specificity. 
Nevertheless, upon close inspection, it becomes clear that the Twombly Court 
viewed plausibility as something triggered by a lack of factual specificity in the 
complaint. This section will explain how this conclusion is possible from a close 
reading of the Twombly opinion. 
A. Plausibility as a Measure for Factual Specificity 
The first theory as to the relationship between factual specificity and plausibility 
is that plausibility serves as a measure for whether the complaint has been drafted 
with sufficient specificity. That is, a complaint contains sufficient factual 
specificity when it is plausible; a pleading must be factually specific enough that it 
strikes the district court judge as a plausible story. Pursuant to this understanding, 
plausibility is a way to measure whether a complaint is sufficiently factually 
specific. Stated slightly differently, plausibility is a function or goal to be achieved 
by the requirement of factual specificity, and therefore, must be considered in 
answering the question whether the complaint has been drafted with sufficient 
factual specificity. 
This understanding of the relationship between factual specificity and 
plausibility is somewhat intuitive. Consider the detective who is investigating a 
murder and is interviewing a suspect as to his whereabouts on the date of the 
murder. The detective is going to want the suspect to tell the story of his 
whereabouts on the date of the murder with as much specificity as possible. We 
have all likely witnessed this familiar scenario dozens of times on television or in 
the movies: 
Detective:  Where were you on the night of the murder? 
Suspect:  At home watching television. 
Detective: What were you watching? 
Suspect:  Sports. 
Detective: Who was playing? Who won? What was the score? 
The detective pushes the suspect for factual specificity because of an intuition 
that if the story is true, the suspect will be able to tell it with greater specificity. The 
first theory as to how plausibility relates to specificity is based on a premise 
somewhat similar to what is occurring in the detective hypothetical. A complaint 
drafted with factual precision and detail tends to signal that the pleader is telling an 
accurate story.148 In the detective example, if the suspect cannot describe with 
                                                                                                                 
 
 148. Professor Hartnett has suggested that there is no necessary correlation between 
specificity and plausibility. See Hartnett, supra note 4, at 496 (“It is not simply that specific 
allegations can make an inference less plausible, but that specificity has no necessary 
connection to plausibility of inference.”). To support his claim, Professor Hartnett discusses 
a hypothetical in which the defendant’s “negligence” is being considered. Whether a 
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factual particularity his actions on the night of the murder, it is presumably because 
he is lying. In the context of complaints in federal court, a dearth of factual 
precision in the complaint does not usually suggest untruthfulness by the drafter but 
rather that the drafter is without firsthand knowledge of the events alleged. This 
was the case in Twombly. If the plaintiffs had had firsthand knowledge of an 
agreement amongst the defendants, they would have included that specific 
information in the complaint. The lack of factual specificity did not suggest that the 
plaintiffs were lying when they alleged that an agreement had been made but rather 
that the plaintiffs were uncertain that this allegation was accurate. On a deeper 
level, the detective example and the first theory of the relationship between factual 
specificity and plausibility are the same in that there is a relationship between 
factual specificity and truth. The more factual specificity, the more plausible is the 
truth of what is stated.  
This understanding of the plausibility analysis can be stated using algebraic 
terms, which will be helpful later in the Article. A complaint describing an event 
generically, rather than specifically, can be expressed by the term “X.” A complaint 
in which an event is described with more factual specificity can be expressed as 
“X1, X2, X3” with each of the separate units representing some specific description 
or factual detail of the event “X.” Thus, X would represent the Twombly 
complaint’s generic description of the alleged conspiracy between the defendants. 
The hypothetical complaint discussed earlier in this Article, in which the same 
alleged event is described in more detail (the meeting took place in Waco, Texas, 
on February 16, 1996, at the Marriot Hotel) would be represented by X1, X2, X3. 
Under the first theory of the relationship between factual specificity and 
plausibility, the factual specificity of the complaint is measured by whether the 
event X is described with sufficient particularity (“1, 2, 3”) such that it is plausible 
that event X actually occurred. In other words: Does X1, X2, X3 imply the existence 
of X? We can use an arrow to represent the inferential analysis, thus: X1, X2, 
X3ÆX? 
Under this interpretation of the relationship between factual specificity and 
plausibility, the plausibility analysis is required for every complaint filed in federal 
court. As detailed in Part I of this Article, a complaint which does not contain 
sufficient factual specificity can be challenged as failing to “state a claim” under 
Rule 8. All civil complaints in federal court must, therefore, meet the standard for 
factual specificity. If factual specificity is measured under the plausibility analysis, 
the plausibility analysis is required in every case. Rule 8 requires factual 
specificity, factual specificity is measured by plausibility, and Rule 8 thus requires 
a determination under the plausibility analysis for every case. 
B. Plausibility Only When Factual Specificity Standards Are Not Met 
The second theory as to the relationship between plausibility and factual 
specificity is based on the assumption that plausibility is not related to the question 
of whether the complaint has been drafted with sufficient factual specificity. Under 
                                                                                                                 
defendant was negligent, however, is a legal question, not a factual question. As will be 
explained below, the plausibility analysis in Twombly and Iqbal was focused on the question 
of whether certain facts were plausible. 
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this theory, the complaint’s factual specificity is measured first, without regard to a 
plausibility analysis. If the complaint is drafted with sufficient factual specificity, 
the plausibility analysis is never reached. If, however, the complaint fails the test 
for factual specificity, the plausibility analysis is triggered. Once triggered, the 
plausibility analysis requires the court to consider whether other factual allegations 
in the complaint permit the plaintiff to proceed even though the complaint contains 
factual allegations that fail the test for factual specificity. 
This view of the relationship between factual specificity and plausibility 
anticipates a slightly different role for the plausibility analysis, once triggered. 
Under both theories, the plausibility analysis requires an inferential inquiry. Under 
the first theory, the inferences are drawn from the factual specificity (or lack 
thereof) contained in the complaint. Under the second theory, however, the 
inferential inquiry is not based on the specifics (or lack thereof) regarding the event 
in question, but rather the other allegations in the complaint that are probative as to 
whether the generically described event actually occurred. 
Here, again, the use of algebraic terms is helpful. Under the second theory of the 
relationship between factual specificity and plausibility, the starting point is the 
failure of an allegation to comply with Rule 8’s standard for factual specificity. 
Thus, we can assume a generic allegation X. The conclusion that the complaint is 
not sufficiently factual specific is made without regard to a plausibility analysis. 
The plausibility analysis then considers whether other allegations in the complaint, 
which will be labeled Y and Z, permit the plaintiff to proceed despite the generic 
allegation of event X. Thus: Y, ZÆ X? 
Notice that under both theories of the relationship between plausibility and 
factual specificity, the truthfulness or accuracy of the allegation of event X is at 
issue. And, under both theories, the plausibility analysis seeks to gauge whether the 
actual occurrence of event X can be inferred from certain information. The two 
theories differ, however, on the source from which event X is to be inferred. Under 
the first theory of the relationship between plausibility and factual specificity, the 
question is whether event X has been described with sufficient specificity to permit 
the inference that event X occurred. Under the second theory, however, the 
question is whether event X can be inferred from other allegations in the complaint. 
The most important aspect of the second theory of the relationship between 
factual specificity and plausibility is that plausibility is not required for every 
complaint filed in federal court. Indeed, in most cases, the plausibility analysis will 
not need to be conducted. A complaint that meets the factual specificity standard—
and plausibility plays no part in this determination—will not be evaluated under a 
plausibility analysis. The plausibility analysis is triggered only when the test for 
factual specificity has failed. 
The second theory as to the relationship between factual specificity and 
plausibility has a similar analytical structure to the groundbreaking views expressed 
by Professor Steinman in his article The Pleading Problem. As part of his call for a 
plain pleading understanding of Rule 8, Professor Steinman advocates for an 
understanding of the plausibility analysis in which “plausibility is a secondary 
inquiry that need not be undertaken at all.”149 Ultimately, I believe that Professor 
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Steinman errs in conceptualizing plausibility as being triggered by “conclusory 
allegations,”150 and I believe that this error can be traced to his failure to realize that 
Twombly was, at heart, a case about factual specificity. This issue will be explored 
at length in the next Part.151 Regardless, the importance of Professor Steinman’s 
idea that plausibility might be triggered by other defects in a complaint cannot be 
overstated. Before his work, the common presumption was that the plausibility 
analysis was required for every civil complaint filed in federal court.152 His article 
was the first to provide an account of the plausibility analysis in which plausibility 
is triggered by other defects in a complaint and thus might often be unnecessary in 
adjudging the legal sufficiency of a complaint.  
C. Twombly and the Relationship Between Factual Specificity and Plausibility 
It takes some effort to determine from Twombly which of the two theories as to 
the relationship between factual specificity and plausibility is correct. The Twombly 
opinion never specifically addresses the issue. This is not necessarily surprising, of 
course, considering that the Twombly opinion never even directly pinpoints factual 
specificity as the fundamental problem with the plaintiffs’ complaint. Moreover, 
because of the nature of the Twombly litigation, either theory could have been 
applied to the facts of the case. Thus, for instance, the idea that plausibility is a 
measure of factual specificity can be used to explain Twombly, on the theory that 
the lack of factual specificity in the complaint regarding the conspiracy between the 
defendants made that allegation implausible. On the other hand, Twombly can be 
                                                                                                                 
 
 150. See id. at 1324–25 (discussing his theory). 
 151. See infra text accompanying notes 224–40. 
 152. See, e.g., Robin J. Effron, The Plaintiff Neutrality Principle: Pleading Complex 
Litigation in the Era of Twombly and Iqbal, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1997, 2045 (2010) 
(arguing that the plausibility standard “applies to all types of civil actions”); Joseph A. 
Seiner, After Iqbal, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 179, 179 (2010) (explaining that the 
plausibility standard “applies to all civil matters”). The conclusion of many commentators 
that plausibility is required in “all civil matters” is likely based on the Court’s 
pronouncement in Iqbal that its “decision in Twombly should [not] be limited to pleadings 
made in the context of an antitrust dispute.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009). 
The “antitrust-only” argument which was rejected in Iqbal, however, is different than the 
question that Steinman addresses, which is whether plausibility will be required for every 
complaint filed in federal court. See Steinman, supra note 5, at 1298–99 (discussing his 
thesis that the plausibility inquiry is not required in every dispute). The Iqbal opinion makes 
clear that the plausibility requirement is transubstantive and, as such, is consistent with the 
general thrust of the Federal Rules. See Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of 
“General Rules,” 2009 WIS. L. REV. 535, 536 (explaining that the Federal Rules are 
“uniformly applicable in all types of cases”); see also David Marcus, The Past, Present, and 
Future of Trans-Substantivity in Federal Civil Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 371, 375 
(2010) (arguing that only legislatures should engage in substance-specific rulemaking). That 
the plausibility analysis is transubstantive, and thus cannot be limited to a particular 
substantive context such as antitrust, does not mean, however, that the analysis is required 
for every civil complaint. Professor Steinman was the first to recognize that plausibility, 
despite being a transubstantive requirement, might nevertheless be inapplicable to a large 
number of complaints filed in federal court. 
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interpreted under the second theory of the relationship between factual specificity 
and plausibility. Pursuant to this understanding, the Court determined that the 
description of the agreement between the defendants was insufficiently fact 
specific; the Court then used plausibility to determine whether the alleged parallel 
conduct by the defendants justified allowing the plaintiffs to proceed despite this 
deficiency in the complaint. 
To support his conclusion that plausibility is a “secondary inquiry”153 which is 
only triggered by other defects in the complaint, Professor Steinman relies 
primarily on two points, both of which are persuasive. The first point considers the 
Iqbal Court’s interpretation of the Twombly opinion. In particular, Steinman 
focuses on the Iqbal Court’s introduction of a “two-step framework for evaluating 
the sufficiency of a complaint.”154 According to Professor Steinman, the Iqbal 
Court recognized that the plausibility analysis in Twombly was necessary only 
because of other defects in the complaint, and thus developed a two-part approach 
in which plausibility was the second, and possibly unnecessary, step.155 Thus, by 
“taking Iqbal’s two steps seriously,”156 the plausibility analysis from Twombly is 
revealed as a secondary consideration, which might be avoided in many cases. I 
think Steinman’s observation is correct and important. As will be discussed more 
fully below, the Iqbal Court misinterpreted Twombly with regard to the sort of 
defects that should trigger the plausibility analysis. But the Iqbal Court did 
correctly recognize that plausibility was not the primary inquiry at the pleadings 
stage and might often be unnecessary. Thus, although the Iqbal Court erred in 
conceiving the first step of the inquiry, it was correct in recognizing that 
plausibility was the second (and possibly unnecessary) step in the analysis. 
The second point on which Professor Steinman relies to support his conclusion 
that plausibility is a secondary consideration is that “the most significant pre-
Twombly authorities remain good law.”157 Here again, I think Professor Steinman 
makes an important point. The Supreme Court had never before relied on a lack of 
plausibility to justify the dismissal of a complaint. And, in doing so in Twombly, it 
did not overturn any previous decisions.158 The Twombly opinion cites previous 
Supreme Court decisions on pleading as if the Twombly plausibility analysis is 
perfectly consistent with those decisions.159 In general, the Twombly opinion is 
written as if the case is simply an application of preexisting pleading principles. 
This approach is much more consistent with the notion that plausibility is a 
secondary consideration which is triggered only by another defect in the complaint. 
Both of Professor Steinman’s points supporting his conclusion that plausibility 
is a secondary consideration support the second theory as to the relationship 
                                                                                                                 
 
 153. Steinman, supra note 5, at 1314. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 1314–18. 
 156. Id. at 1314. 
 157. Id. at 1320. 
 158. Conley’s “no set of facts” language was retired, but the case itself was not 
overturned. See WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 139, § 72 (“Justice Souter carefully noted that 
Conley itself was not being overturned . . . .”). 
 159. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554–55 (2007) (citing various 
Supreme Court cases interpreting Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 
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between factual specificity and plausibility, in which plausibility is only triggered 
by a lack of factual specificity. There is, however, another, more obvious argument 
supporting the notion that plausibility is triggered only by a lack of factual 
specificity: the way in which the Twombly court used the plausibility analysis. 
 In describing the two different theories regarding the relationship between 
factual specificity and plausibility, this Article has made the observation that under 
either theory the question is whether a certain fact can be inferred. The difference 
in the two theories is the source from which this inference is based. Thus, for the 
first theory, in which plausibility is a tool by which the factual specificity of a 
complaint is measured, the question is whether an event can be inferred from the 
factual specificity with which the event is described. Stated algebraically: X1, X2, 
X3 Æ X? Under the second theory, the inference as to whether the event occurred is 
based on other allegations contained in the complaint. Thus: Y, ZÆ X? 
Viewed from this perspective, the Twombly opinion clearly falls under the 
second theory, in which plausibility is triggered only by a lack of factual specificity 
and in which the plausibility analysis is used to determine whether other allegations 
in the complaint infer the existence of the generically described event. In Twombly, 
the plausibility analysis was used to determine whether the allegations of parallel 
conduct plausibly suggested the existence of an illegal agreement amongst the 
defendants: “[T]he plaintiffs assert that the [defendants’] parallel conduct was 
‘strongly suggestive of conspiracy.’ . . . But it was not suggestive of conspiracy, not 
if history teaches anything.”160 Using our algebraic symbols, the allegations of 
parallel conduct were Y and Z. According to the Court, Y and Z did not plausibly 
suggest the existence of X, the alleged illegal agreement. 
When the Court addressed the lack of factual specificity in the Twombly 
complaint, it did not use the term “plausibility.” The Court did not intimate that a 
trial court judge should infer whether an allegation is true based on the factual 
specificity with which that event is described. The entire discussion of the 
complaint’s factual specificity is conducted without reference to plausibility.161 The 
notice standard for measuring factual specificity from Conley is cited, but 
plausibility is not mentioned. 
Thus, by closely reading the Twombly opinion, one recognizes that the 
plausibility analysis used by the Court was divorced from the question of the 
factual specificity of the complaint. The Court detailed the lack of factual 
specificity in the Twombly complaint without mentioning plausibility. And, when 
the Court engaged in a plausibility analysis, it did so without regard to the question 
of factual specificity. Assuming that a complaint drafted with more factual 
specificity would have survived a motion to dismiss (as this Article presumes), 
however, leads to the almost inescapable conclusion that the Twombly complaint’s 
lack of factual specificity triggered the plausibility analysis by the Court. This 
explains why the Court in Twombly wrote as if the plausibility analysis it used was 
completely consistent with preexisting pleading principles: Never before had the 
Court affirmed the dismissal of a complaint for lack of factual specificity. Twombly, 
then, was a case of first impression. The plausibility analysis was not introduced as 
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a new gloss on accepted pleading standards. Instead, the plausibility analysis was 
the Court’s response to an issue it had never before had to address: How should a 
district court proceed when a complaint has failed the test for factual specificity? 
If plausibility is triggered by a lack of factual specificity, it is important to know 
what is required for factual specificity under Rule 8. Alas, we are back to the 
original question—factual specificity—which was part of the impetus for the 
Federal Rules. Recall that the Federal Rules were, in part, a reaction to the detailed 
factual specificity that some judges had required under the code pleading era. In 
Conley v. Gibson,162 the Court affirmed that very little factual specificity would be 
required under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.163 And then the issue mostly 
went away, at least as far as the Supreme Court was concerned.164 That is, at least 
until Twombly. If the plausibility analysis introduced by the Court in Twombly is 
required only when the standard for factual specificity has not been met, the 
Twombly case is a living, breathing example of the application of Rule 8’s standard 
for factual specificity to an actual complaint. All legal commentators recognize 
Twombly as an important case, but I would submit that the true import of the 
opinion has been obscured in the effort to figure out plausibility.165 The Twombly 
opinion is the Court’s first discussion of the factual specificity required under Rule 
8 in decades. This is the most important aspect of the Twombly case. To play upon 
the old cliché, all the attention regarding Twombly has been directed toward the cart 
rather than the horse. And it just so happens that the horse in this case is an age-old 
question—the factual specificity required for a plaintiff’s complaint—on which the 
Supreme Court has been mostly silent for decades. 
Unfortunately, on the question of the factual specificity required under Rule 8, 
the Twombly opinion again obscures rather than enlightens. The Twombly opinion 
and holding support two competing versions as to how a court should measure 
whether a complaint has been drafted with sufficient factual specificity. 
Unfortunately, the Iqbal Court adopted the wrong version. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 162. 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
 163. Id. at 47 (“[T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set 
out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim.”). For a full discussion, see the text 
accompanying notes 65–86. 
 164. The Supreme Court has periodically confirmed that the factual specificity standard 
in Rule 8 did not permit a heightened pleading standard for certain substantive areas. See 
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002) (rejecting the heightened pleading 
requirement employed by the court of appeals in an employment discrimination lawsuit); 
Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 163 
(1993) (holding that “[a] federal court may not apply a ‘heightened pleading standard’ . . . in 
civil rights cases alleging municipal liability”). 
 165. See Catherine T. Struve, Foreword: Procedure as Palimpsest, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 
421, 421 (2010) (describing the Twombly case as a “landmark pleading decision” but 
comparing it to the abstract painting of Cy Twombly). 
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IV. MEASURING THE FACTUAL SPECIFICITY OF A COMPLAINT: WHY IQBAL IS 
WRONG 
Because plausibility becomes necessary only when the complaint is deficiently 
factually specific, Twombly is important for delineating what level of factual 
specificity is required under Rule 8. Unfortunately, here again, the Twombly 
opinion is ambiguous. There are two ways to interpret the Twombly opinion as to 
how the Court reached the conclusion that the plaintiffs’ complaint had not been 
drafted with sufficient factual specificity. Under the first interpretation, the 
complaint was not sufficiently factually specific because it did not describe the 
event on which the defendants’ liability was based with a sufficient degree of detail 
and particularity. This interpretation of Twombly will be labeled as the 
“transactional” understanding of the case. The other interpretation of the Twombly 
opinion is that the Court determined that the complaint in that case was not 
factually specific because it contained “conclusory” allegations; this will be labeled 
as the “conclusory” understanding of Twombly. The conclusory understanding of 
Twombly is the one adopted by the Court in Iqbal. 
This Part will address the problems that arise from the Iqbal Court’s 
interpretation of Twombly, in which the plausibility analysis is triggered by the 
mere presence of conclusory allegations. This Part will argue that these problems 
are insurmountable and that the Iqbal opinion will consequently be overturned. 
A. The “Transactional” Interpretation of Twombly 
The Twombly case can be read for the proposition that a complaint is sufficiently 
factually specific if it provides a basic description of the transaction or event on 
which the liability of the defendant is premised. The Court noted in its opinion that 
the plaintiffs’ complaint “mentioned no specific time, place, or person involved in 
the alleged conspiracies.”166 The Court also contrasted the bare assertion of 
conspiracy in Twombly with the model form of pleading negligence accompanying 
the Federal Rules, which clearly identifies the defendant, the place where the 
accident occurred, and the time and date when the accident occurred.167 In short, a 
transactional understanding of the factual specificity requirement in Rule 8 would 
require the plaintiff to identify the who, what, when, where, and how of the event 
or transaction on which the defendant’s liability is premised. More specifically, it 
would require the plaintiff to identify her version of the particulars regarding the 
transaction or occurrence on which the defendant’s liability is based. The Twombly 
complaint failed to meet this standard. 
I am not the first to propose a transactional understanding of the factual 
specificity requirements of Rule 8.168 The suitability of this approach to factual 
                                                                                                                 
 
 166. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 565 n.10. 
 167. Id. 
 168. See, e.g., WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 30, § 1215, at 194 (“Implicit [from 
Conley’s notice pleading standard for factual specificity] is the notion that the rules do 
contemplate a statement of circumstances, occurrences, and events in support of the claim 
being presented.”); Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 460–61 (1943) 
(“The notice in mind is rather that of the general nature of the case and the circumstances or 
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specificity has, however, perhaps not been completely realized. Although the 
Federal Rules contemplated that pleadings would proceed upon a more cursory 
description of the underlying factual context of the dispute between the parties than 
what had been allowed under code pleading, the rules accepted code pleading’s 
primary premise that pleadings (and, to some extent, the law in general) should be 
primarily about stories rather than legal doctrine.169 The Federal Rules, then, 
always contemplated that the plaintiff’s complaint would tell a story about a real-
world transaction or occurrence. In fact, the phrase “transaction or occurrence” 
appears in a host of federal rules. Plaintiffs can join together in one lawsuit only if 
their claims arise out of the “same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions 
or occurrences.”170 Multiple defendants can be sued in the same lawsuit only if the 
claims against the defendants arise out of the “same transaction, occurrence, or 
series of transactions or occurrences.”171 A defendant is required to assert a 
counterclaim that “arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject 
matter of the opposing party’s claim.”172 Defendants (and plaintiffs) can bring 
crossclaims against other defendants (and plaintiffs) only if their crossclaim “arises 
out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the original 
action.”173 A party can amend its pleading and have that pleading “relate back” to 
the date of the original pleading only if the amendment arises out of the same 
“conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out . . . in the original pleading.”174 Indeed, 
the legal realists behind the adoption of the Federal Rules have so successfully 
engrained the notion that pleadings (and, more generally, legal disputes) are, at 
heart, stories about transactions or occurrences that the approach has transcended 
the Federal Rules into other areas of procedure. Preclusion rules often hinge on an 
analysis that incorporates the “transaction or occurrence” inquiry.175 And, in United 
Mine Workers v. Gibbs,176 the Court interpreted the “case” or “controversy” 
language in Article III, Section 2177 to require something very much akin to the 
“transaction or occurrence” language that litters the Federal Rules.178 
Considering the ubiquity of the “transaction or occurrence” analysis throughout 
the rules, then, it should come as no surprise that Rule 8, which sets out the 
requirements for the initial pleading that begins a lawsuit, would also incorporate 
the concept. Indeed, unless a complaint describes in some detail as to the 
                                                                                                                 
events upon which it is based, so as to differentiate it from other acts or events, to inform the 
opponent of the affair or transaction to be litigated—but not of details which he should 
ascertain for himself in preparing his defense—and to tell the court of the broad outlines of 
the case.”); Steinman, supra note 5, at 1334 (“A plaintiff’s complaint must provide an 
adequate transactional narrative, that is, an identification of the real-world acts or events 
underlying the plaintiff’s claim.”). 
 169. See supra text accompanying notes 19–22. 
 170. FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(1)(A).  
 171. FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(2)(A). 
 172. FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a)(1)(A). 
 173. FED. R. CIV. P. 13(g). 
 174. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(B). 
 175. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(1) (1982).  
 176. 383 U.S. 715 (1966). 
 177. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.  
 178. See Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725 (“The state and federal claims must derive from a 
common nucleus of operative fact.”). 
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transaction or event being sued upon, some of the other rules that depend on an 
identification of the relevant transaction or event might be difficult to apply. For 
example, a defendant considering whether he is required to assert a counterclaim 
against a plaintiff will need to know the transaction or occurrence that is the basis 
of the plaintiff’s suit. The entire structure of the rules is organized according to 
“transactions or occurrences.” If the plaintiff fails to identify with sufficient 
specificity the transaction or occurrence that is the basis of her suit, the rules do not 
work properly. 
Of course, concluding that a transactional approach to the factual specificity 
question is proper is only a start in developing a comprehensive understanding of 
exactly how much specificity is required and which events must be factually 
described in the plaintiff’s complaint. It advances the inquiry beyond Conley’s 
initial formulation of the test for factual specificity by providing an answer to the 
“Notice of what?” question. However, the ultimate proof, as they say, is in the 
pudding—in how the test is applied. The plaintiffs in Twombly were suing on an 
event or transaction—the alleged agreement between the defendants to engage in 
parallel business behavior—that they were unable to describe with any specificity. 
Under a transactional understanding of the notice test for factual specificity, 
Twombly’s complaint was obviously deficient. 
B. The “Conclusory” Interpretation of Twombly 
Although the transactional understanding of Twombly can be used to explain the 
resort to plausibility in that case, there is another “plausible” reading of how the 
Court reached that conclusion in Twombly. Pursuant to this understanding, the 
resort to plausibility was necessary in Twombly because the complaint included 
conclusory allegations. This is how the Iqbal Court read the Twombly opinion, and 
this was the critical error made by the Iqbal Court. 
The Iqbal litigation was initiated by several individuals who had been arrested 
and detained by federal officials in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist 
attacks.179 The litigation involved numerous claims asserted by two plaintiffs 
against multiple defendants.180 As the litigation proceeded to the Supreme Court, 
however, only the claims made by Iqbal against John Ashcroft and Robert Mueller 
were under consideration.181 These claims centered on the policies adopted by the 
federal government regarding the confinement of an arrestee designated as a 
“person of high interest” to the post-September 11th investigation.182 The 
complaint alleged that Ashcroft and Mueller had been involved in shaping this 
policy and that their involvement had been fueled by an unconstitutional 
discriminatory animus.183 
                                                                                                                 
 
 179. Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04 CV 01809 JG SMG, 2005 WL 2375202, at *1 
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded sub nom. Iqbal v. 
Hasty, 490 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007).  
 180. Id. 
 181. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1942 (2009). 
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Defendants Ashcroft and Mueller moved to dismiss the claims against them on 
the basis of qualified immunity.184 The district court denied their motion.185 
Defendants Ashcroft and Mueller took an interlocutory appeal of this decision to 
the Second Circuit.186 While the case was pending before the Second Circuit, 
however, the Twombly decision was rendered by the Supreme Court.187 The Second 
Circuit considered the applicability of Twombly to the case,188 but nevertheless 
affirmed the district court’s denial of defendants’ motion to dismiss.189 
The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that Iqbal’s “complaint fail[ed] to 
plead sufficient facts to state a claim for purposeful and unlawful discrimination 
against [Ashcroft and Mueller].”190 The Court’s decision was based on the 
complaint’s failure to comply with the plausibility rubric introduced in Twombly, 
which the Court described as consisting of a “two-pronged approach.”191 The Iqbal 
Court’s description of the “two-pronged approach” involving plausibility is 
consistent with the understanding of Twombly advanced in Part II of this Article. 
The Iqbal Court understood that the resort to plausibility in Twombly was necessary 
only because the Twombly complaint was deficient in other regards. The Iqbal 
Court noted that had the “Court simply credited the allegation of a conspiracy [in 
Twombly], the plaintiffs would have stated a claim for relief and been entitled to 
proceed perforce.”192 In other words, the Iqbal Court recognized that the resort to 
plausibility in Twombly was necessary only because the plaintiffs’ allegation of a 
conspiracy was somehow defective and thus was “not entitled to the assumption of 
truth.”193 
The critical question is why the allegation of conspiracy in Twombly was not 
entitled to the presumption of truth and thus subject to the plausibility analysis. 
According to the Iqbal Court, the defect in the Twombly complaint was that the 
allegation of conspiracy was a “legal conclusion”194 or a “conclusory 
statement[].”195 Because the complaint in Iqbal was also conclusory, and in this 
sense was similar to the Twombly complaint, the Iqbal Court proceeded to 
plausibility in Iqbal as it had done in Twombly.196 
                                                                                                                 
 
 184. Elmaghraby, 2005 WL 2375202, at *10. 
 185. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1944. 
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 193. See id. at 1951. 
 194. Id. at 1950. 
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 196. See id. at 1949–51. 
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C. What Makes an Allegation Conclusory? 
Before explaining the problems that arise from the Iqbal Court’s “conclusory” 
reading of Twombly, it is imperative to have a working definition of what is meant 
by the term “conclusory.” This Section will address that issue. This is not an easy 
task,197 as the term “conclusory” is not generally recognized or used outside of 
legal circles.198 Even within the legal community, the term is often associated with 
different concepts. Indeed, the Iqbal and Twombly opinions use a variety of 
different terms in describing the deficiency of the allegations in those cases: “legal 
conclusions,”199 “conclusory statements,”200 “conclusions,”201 “bare assertions,”202 
conclusory allegations,203 and “nonconclusory factual allegation.”204 This 
smorgasbord of terms, however, obfuscates two distinct principles operating within 
this pleading vocabulary: legal conclusions and conclusory factual allegations.205 
                                                                                                                 
 
 197. Brown, supra note 6, at 1286 (“Defining conclusory is a difficult task . . . .”). 
 198. See Gertrude Block, ‘Conclusory’ v. ‘Conclusionary,’ PA. LAW, Jan.–Feb. 1999, at 
53 (“A search of both law and lay dictionaries revealed a surprising fact: Neither conclusory 
nor conclusionary is listed in Ballentine’s Law Dictionary (Third Edition), Black’s Law 
Dictionary (Fifth Edition), Words and Phrases, The American Heritage Dictionary (Second 
College Edition), or Webster’s New Third International Dictionary (Unabridged).”); Eugene 
Volokh, Conclusory, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 16, 2007, 1:41 PM), 
http://volokh.com/2007/05/16/conclusory/ (discussing how the term “conclusory” is only 
used in legal circles and how that term is used within the legal community). The Wyoming 
Supreme Court was so disturbed that the term “conclusory” is used only within legal 
language that it thought it necessary to confirm the suitability of the term: “After painstaking 
deliberation, we have decided that we like the word ‘conclusory,’ and we are distressed by 
its omission from the English language. We now proclaim that henceforth ‘conclusory’ is 
appropriately used in the opinions of this court.”). Greenwood v. Wierdsma, 741 P.2d 1079, 
1086 n.3 (Wyo. 1987). 
 199. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 564. 
 200. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. 
 201. Id. at 1950; see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 552. 
 202. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951. 
 203. Id. (“As such, the allegations are conclusory and not entitled to be assumed true.”). 
 204. Id. at 1950. 
 205. The discussion of legal conclusions and conclusory factual allegations in this Article 
is not intended as a thorough account of the myriad issues related to the distinction made 
within our legal system between questions of fact and questions of law. For instance, 
decision-making authority at the trial court level is usually divided based on the distinction 
between questions of fact and questions of law. LON L. FULLER & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, 
BASIC CONTRACT LAW 593 (6th ed. 1996) (“It is commonly said that questions of fact are for 
the jury and questions of law are for the judge. A more realistic analysis would be that 
questions the legal system assigns to the jury are called ‘questions of fact,’ and questions the 
legal system assigns to the judge are called ‘questions of law.’” (emphasis in original)). The 
relationship between a district court’s judgment and the ability of an appellate court to 
review that decision depends on whether the appellant is asking the appellate court to review 
a question of law or fact. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695–700 (1996) 
(discussing the appropriate standard of review of a district court’s legal and factual 
conclusions within the context of a probable cause determination). Even more mundane 
questions, such as the permissible scope of an expert’s testimony at trial and the appropriate 
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1. Legal Conclusions 
Legal conclusions are determinations about the legal effect of certain facts.206 As 
such, they fall squarely within the province of a judge rather than the fact finder.207 
To demonstrate, consider a statute that restricts vehicles from parks, and assume 
that a plaintiff has brought suit and alleged that the defendant was riding a bicycle 
in a park. Whether the statute applies to the bicycle rider is a legal conclusion. That 
the defendant was riding a bicycle is a factual question, of course. But the legal 
effect of that bicycle riding (whether the statute applies to this conduct) is a legal 
question that must be answered by a judge. The answer to this legal question is a 
legal conclusion. 
Because legal conclusions involve questions of law for a judge to decide, when 
a legal conclusion is stated in a pleading (such as a complaint), it is irrelevant 
except as to serve notice to the judge as to a particular legal argument being pressed 
by a party litigant.208 The judge is obviously not bound by the legal conclusions or 
                                                                                                                 
content of an interrogatory discovery request, can depend on the law-fact distinction. See 
O’Brien v. International Brotherhood. of Electrical Workers, 443 F. Supp. 1182, 1187–88 
(N.D. Ga. 1977) (considering whether interrogatories were permissible by distinguishing 
whether the interrogatory called for a fact, a pure question of law, or a mixed question of law 
and fact). See generally Jill Wieber Lens, The (Overlooked) Consequence of Easing the 
Prohibition of Expert Legal Testimony in Professional Negligence Claims, 48 U. LOUISVILLE 
L. REV. 53, 55–60 (2009) (explaining the traditional prohibition against expert testimony 
regarding questions of law). Rather, the purpose of this Article is simply to consider this 
larger issue within the specific context of pleading.  
 206. Legal conclusions also arise within the context of pure questions of law. A pure 
question of law is a legal issue whose resolution does not depend on the facts of a particular 
dispute between litigants. Kira A. Davis, Note, Judicial Estoppel and Inconsistent Positions 
of Law Applied to Fact and Pure Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 191, 201 (2003) (defining a pure 
issue of law as a “legal issue[] unrelated to the facts of the case”). This Article will focus on 
the legal conclusions that depend upon the existence of particular facts, as these types of 
legal conclusions are more easily confused with the allegations of fact that were involved in 
Twombly and Iqbal. See infra text accompanying notes 216–20. 
 207. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, 9B FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 2521, at 219 (3d ed. 2011) (“[T]he general proposition remains true: rules of 
law are for the court to enforce.”); Paul F. Kirgis, The Right to a Jury Decision on Questions 
of Fact Under the Seventh Amendment, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1125, 1127–28 (2003) (“[C]ourts in 
both England and the United States have generally assumed that the jury’s primary function 
is to decide questions of fact, while judges may permissibly decide questions of law.”). Of 
course, there are exceptions to this principle. See 21A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH 
W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 5052, at 249 (2d ed. 2005) (“[T]he 
jury can decide many questions of law . . . .”). 
 208. See Clark, supra note 97, at 192 (“You don’t plead malicious prosecution, you don’t 
plead false imprisonment, you just say what plaintiff and defendant did, what happened. 
Then it is for the court to put on any legal labels that are needed. If the parties do give such 
labels, that’s just a way of being helpful. So if the pleader wants to tell us a little theory, 
that’s all right, but it’s not binding.”). Some commentators have even suggested that a legal 
conclusion should not be included in a complaint. See Kevin M. Clermont, Three Myths 
About Twombly-Iqbal, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1337, 1355 (2010) (“[A] plaintiff should 
not even be alleging law.”). Although I agree with the thrust of Clermont’s point, I believe 
that legal conclusions in a complaint can alert the judge to a particular legal theory on which 
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arguments that are asserted in a complaint. Thus, in the example above, if the 
pleading had stated that “On January 15, 2009, defendant was riding a bicycle in 
Central Park and was thus operating a vehicle in the park,” a judge evaluating the 
sufficiency of that complaint would not be required to defer to the legal conclusion 
that a bicycle constitutes a vehicle under the state. Of course, the judge would have 
to assume the truth of the specifically pleaded fact that the defendant was riding a 
bicycle in Central Park. But, as to the legal questions raised by the complaint, the 
legal argument made in the pleading is not entitled to deference. 
The litigation culminating in the Supreme Court’s decision in Haddle v. 
Garrison further demonstrates this basic proposition.209 In Haddle, the plaintiff 
sued under the Civil Rights Act of 1871 after he was terminated from his 
employment.210 The main legal question in the litigation was whether an at-will 
employment relationship qualified as “property” under the statute.211 The district 
court had concluded that an at-will employee did not have a property interest under 
the statute in his employment relationship.212 The district court reached this 
conclusion despite language in the plaintiff’s complaint stating that the plaintiff 
“had been deprived of a property interest under the Civil Rights Act of 1871.”213 
The Supreme Court ultimately reversed the district court’s dismissal of the 
complaint, based on the Court’s conclusion that the statute did include at-will 
employment relationships within the term “property.”214 The language in the 
complaint that the plaintiff had been deprived of property under the statute, 
however, was completely irrelevant to the legal analysis performed by the district 
court and the Supreme Court. That the plaintiff had been terminated and had been 
an at-will employee were not in dispute in Haddle; the issue in the litigation was as 
to the legal effect of those agreed-upon facts. The complaint’s assertion that these 
facts entitled the plaintiff to relief under the statute was perhaps helpful to the 
district court in identifying the plaintiff’s legal theory for relief; but, obviously, 
neither the district court nor the Supreme Court was in any way bound by the 
complaint’s legal conclusion in performing the legal task of interpreting the statute. 
Neither of the problematic allegations in Twombly and Iqbal were legal 
conclusions, despite the Court’s occasional use of this term in both Twombly and 
Iqbal. As will be explained below, the drafters in both Twombly and Iqbal clearly 
intended to make factual assertions rather than legal conclusions, and the Court 
recognized this characteristic of the allegations in both cases.215 
                                                                                                                 
the plaintiff is going to rely in the litigation. In this sense, then, a legal conclusion within a 
complaint can be helpful, and there is no real harm when a complaint contains a legal 
conclusion. 
 209. 525 U.S. 121 (1998).  
 210. Id. at 122–23.  
 211. Id. at 125.  
 212. Id. at 121. 
 213. Id. at 123. 
 214. See id. at 125–26. 
 215. See infra text accompanying notes 216–20. 
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2. Conclusory Factual Allegation 
A conclusory factual allegation, as compared to a legal conclusion, is an 
assertion about something that occurred in the real world. A conclusory factual 
allegation operates within the larger category of factual allegations. What 
distinguishes a conclusory factual allegation is that it is an allegation of fact based 
on inferences from other facts but whose actual existence is nevertheless doubted 
by the audience considering the allegation. Broken down into separate elements, 
then, a conclusory factual allegation is (1) an allegation of fact (2) based on 
inferences from other facts (3) whose inferential value is doubted by the audience. 
Stated in algebraic terms, a conclusory factual allegation arises when Party A 
alleges Fact 1 because of the existence of Fact 2, but Party B doubts the inference 
of Fact 1 from Fact 2. 
(1) “An Allegation of Fact” 
A conclusory factual allegation differs from a legal conclusion included within a 
complaint in that it is intended as an assertion about an event that occurred in the 
real world rather than the legal effect of that occurrence.216 In some instances, it can 
be difficult to distinguish between the two.217 To demonstrate, consider the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Papasan v. Allain,218 which was quoted in both 
Twombly219 and Iqbal.220 In Papasan, the Court grappled with the plaintiffs’ 
assertion that they “had been denied their right to a minimally adequate 
education.”221 This allegation could be viewed as either a legal conclusion or a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 216. Within the context of criminal procedure, the Supreme Court has sometimes referred 
to questions regarding the actual events in dispute as historical facts. See Ornelas v. United 
States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996) (“The principal components of a determination of 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause will be the events which occurred leading up to the 
stop or search, and then the decision whether these historical facts . . . amount to reasonable 
suspicion or to probable cause.”). Other commentators sometimes refer to “what happened?” 
factual questions as pure questions of fact. See Patricia J. Kaeding, Clearly Erroneous 
Review of Mixed Questions of Law and Fact: The Likelihood of Confusion Determination in 
Trademark Law, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1291, 1296–97 (1992) (“Where, however, a 
determination is neither a question of pure fact nor clearly a question of law, an appellate 
court must decide whether to treat it as law or fact for purposes of review.”). 
 217. This was the “conclusion” of Charles Clark. See CLARK, supra note 24, at 231 
(discussing the “illusory nature of the distinctions between facts, law, and evidence”); id. (“It 
should further be noted that the attempted distinction between facts, law, and evidence, 
viewed as anything other than a convenient distinction of degree, seems philosophically and 
logically unsound.”); see also Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the 
Regulation of Court Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 891 (2009) (describing as “hopeless” the 
distinctions made within the code pleading era between “allegations of ultimate fact, legal 
conclusions, and evidentiary facts”). 
 218. 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) (concluding that, on a motion to dismiss, courts “are not 
bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”). 
 219. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 
 220. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). 
 221. Papasan, 478 U.S. at 285. 
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factual allegation. If the lawyer who drafted the complaint intended to make a 
descriptive claim as to the education received by his clients, it was a factual 
allegation. If, however, the intent was to argue that the funding disparity amongst 
school districts in Mississippi, which had been described in the complaint, should 
be deemed a violation of the right to a “minimally adequate education,”222 the 
complaint’s allegation was simply a legal conclusion. The Supreme Court, 
considering the location of the allegation within the overall context of the 
complaint, determined that the drafter of the complaint intended to assert only a 
legal conclusion rather than a factual assertion.223  
Because it can sometimes be difficult to ascertain whether a pleader has 
intended to make a factual statement or a legal conclusion,224 some commentators 
have resolved that there is no difference between the two.225 This is an analytical 
mistake.226 Simply because it might sometimes be difficult to distinguish between 
the two does not mean that there is not a clear difference between them.227 The 
                                                                                                                 
 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. at 285–86. The Court made the same interpretive judgment about the plaintiff’s 
complaint in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005). In Dura, the 
plaintiffs’ complaint, which asserted a securities fraud claim, was dismissed by the district 
court. Id. at 338–40. In order to win at trial on this claim, the plaintiff would have needed to 
prove the elements of “economic loss” and “loss causation.” Id. at 341–42. The plaintiffs’ 
complaint alleged that the defendant had made misrepresentations regarding the possible 
future approval of a new asthmatic spray device, and that when the company announced that 
the spray device would not be approved the “share price temporarily fell but almost fully 
recovered within one week.” Id. at 339. The plaintiffs’ complaint also included the following 
allegation: “‘In reliance on the integrity of the market, the plaintiffs . . . paid artificially 
inflated prices for Dura securities’ and the plaintiffs suffered ‘damages’ thereby.” Id. at 340. 
The Court interpreted the allegation alleging “damages” as a legal conclusion:  
The statement implies that the plaintiffs’ loss consisted of the ‘artificially 
inflated’ purchase ‘prices.’ The complaint’s failure to claim that Dura’s share 
price fell significantly after the truth became known suggests that the plaintiffs 
considered the allegation of purchase price inflation alone sufficient. The 
complaint contains nothing that suggests otherwise.  
Id. at 347. Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, the Court disagreed with this legal conclusion: 
“[T]he ‘artificially inflated purchase price’ is not itself a relevant economic loss.” Id. 
 224. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 46, at 466 (“The line between scrutiny of legal 
conclusions and scrutiny of factual conclusions is often obscure, however.”). 
 225. See supra notes 210–14 and accompanying text. 
 226. As my Civil Procedure professor, Sam Issacharoff, used to say (paraphrasing): “That 
the ocean is aqua, and neither clearly blue nor green, does not mean that the grass is not 
green nor the sky blue.” 
 227. It must be remembered that most of the conclusions by Clark and others who appear 
to reject the division between factual and legal assertions were formed as a reaction to code 
pleading. Code pleading dismissed complaints that were drafted with either too much, or too 
little, factual specificity. See YEAZELL, supra note 20, at 357 (“Courts [under Code pleading] 
held some complaints too detailed—and rejected them for pleading ‘mere evidence’; others 
were rejected because, cast at a higher level of generality, they stated ‘conclusions,’ a flaw 
equally fatal under the Codes.”). Thus, these opinions were specifically addressed at the 
distinction made during the Code pleading era between facts pleaded with the right amount 
of specificity and those pleaded too specifically or too generally, and the terms that courts 
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difficulty is in ascertaining the intent of the drafter. This inherent difficulty in 
surmising intent, however, should not blur the division between these two distinct 
concepts. 
In any event, in most instances it is clear whether the drafter intended to make a 
factual assertion or legal conclusion. For instance, the problematic allegations in 
both Twombly and Iqbal were obviously factual assertions, despite language in both 
opinions describing the allegations as legal conclusions. In Twombly, the “bare 
assertion”228 that a conspiracy or agreement had occurred was a factual assertion 
about an event which had occurred in the real world. The plaintiffs were not certain 
that this real-world event had actually transpired, and thus qualified their factual 
assertion by asserting it only “upon information and belief.”229 A competent lawyer 
would not assert a legal conclusion “upon information and belief.” Furthermore, the 
notion that parallel behavior was alone sufficient for liability had already been 
firmly rejected in preexisting antitrust case law.230 Thus, there was no reason for 
the plaintiffs’ lawyers in Twombly to draft a complaint that drew the legal 
conclusion of liability under the Sherman Act merely from the existence of parallel 
behavior. In Iqbal, the allegation that the defendants had adopted a policy “solely 
on account of”231 discriminatory reasons was also a factual assertion.232 The 
drafters of the Iqbal complaint clearly intended to allege something that they 
believed had occurred in the real world: that the defendants had acted on the basis 
of a discriminatory purpose. 
                                                                                                                 
had used to express these admittedly amorphous concepts. Jack B. Weinstein & Daniel H. 
Distler, Comments on Procedural Reform: Drafting Pleading Rules, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 518, 
520–21 (1957) (discussing how the courts during the Code pleading era used the terms 
“ultimate facts, evidence, and conclusions” when discussing the question of factual 
specificity). Apart from the question of the specificity with which factual allegations are 
drawn, however, is the more basic question of whether the allegation involves an assertion of 
fact or law. I believe this distinction is clearer, and that most of the comments by 
commentators such as Clark and others that appear to reject this distinction are actually 
directed to the separate, and less clear, question of the factual specificity of a factual 
allegation. And, in any event, the division of labor within our civil justice system requires 
that this distinction between assertions of law and fact be made. Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. VII 
(“[i]n Suits at common law . . . the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried 
by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according 
to the rules of the common law.”); see Hartnett, supra note 4, at 488–89 (“So long as there is 
a motion that accepts the truth of a pleader’s factual allegations and tests for their legal 
sufficiency, courts must distinguish between factual and legal allegations. And so long as 
there is a motion designed to test the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff’s claim, courts cannot be 
bound to treat a plaintiff’s legal conclusions as true.”). 
 228. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). 
 229. Id. at 551 (quoting Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint at ¶ 51, 
Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (No. 02 CIV. 10220). 
 230. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984) (holding 
that parallel conduct is not sufficient for liability under the Sherman Act); Theatre Enters., 
Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954) (same).  
 231. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951 (quoting Complaint at ¶ 96, Iqbal, 129 S. 
Ct. 1937 (No. 07-1015)). 
 232. Cf. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982) (“Treating issues of intent 
as factual matters for the trier of fact is commonplace.”). 
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(2) “Based on Inferences from Other Facts” 
Another characteristic of a conclusory factual allegation is that it infers one fact 
from the existence of other facts. When a plaintiff makes a conclusory factual 
allegation, the plaintiff is conceding that he or she has no independent, firsthand 
knowledge of that factual allegation. Rather than describing the factual allegation 
directly, then, the plaintiff wishes to infer the fact from the existence of other facts 
on which the plaintiff does have firsthand knowledge. 
Outside the context of pleading, the process of inferring facts from the existence 
of other facts is usually associated with the term “circumstantial evidence.”233 
Thus, consider a case in which the plaintiff wishes to establish that the defendant 
was talking on a cell phone at the time of an automobile accident between the 
plaintiff and the defendant. If the plaintiff directly saw the defendant talking on the 
phone (or has another witness to this behavior), the plaintiff (or witness) can testify 
as to that fact. If, however, the plaintiff did not directly see the defendant talking on 
the phone, she might wish to prove this fact by circumstantial evidence. If the 
defendant’s cell phone log showed that the defendant had placed or received a call 
immediately before the accident, this record could be used as circumstantial 
evidence to show that the defendant had been talking on the phone at the time of 
the accident. 
Put in algebraic terms, then, a conclusory factual allegation will follow an 
established pattern, wherein Fact A is presumed from the existence of Facts B and 
C. The problematic allegations in both Twombly and Iqbal fall into this pattern. In 
Twombly, the plaintiffs alleged that a conspiracy or agreement had occurred, not 
because they had directly perceived this agreement, but because of the existence of 
the parallel business behavior of the defendants. In Iqbal, the plaintiffs believed 
that the defendants had acted with a discriminatory purpose because of the 
existence of large numbers of Arab-Muslim men who had been arrested as part of 
the investigation of the terrorists’ attacks of 9/11 and because of their belief that no 
penological reason could explain the defendants’ policies. 
(3) “Whose Inferential Value Is Doubted by the Audience” 
For an allegation of fact to be “conclusory,” it is also necessary that the 
“audience” doubt the inferential link that the speaker (the pleader) believes 
exists.234 The term “conclusory,” then, represents an opinion as to whether the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 233. See 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF 
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW INCLUDING THE STATUTES AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS OF 
ALL JURISDICTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA § 25 (2d ed. 1923) (distinguishing 
between testimonial evidence and circumstantial evidence and defining the latter as “all 
offered evidentiary facts not being assertions from which the truth of the matters asserted is 
desired to be inferred”). 
 234. See Block, supra note 198, at 53 (“Both conclusory and conclusionary, in current 
legal usage, describe a conclusion reached without adequate proof or evidence.”); 
Conclusory Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/conclusory (defining conclusory as “consisting of or relating to a 
conclusion or assertion for which no supporting evidence is offered”).  
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alleged fact follows from the supporting facts. It is a pejorative term. A person 
drafting a complaint does not believe the inferences made in the complaint are 
“conclusory.” Rather, the pleader believes that the existence of Facts B and C 
“conclusively” establish the existence of Fact A. To somebody who disagrees with 
the factual inferences, however, the factual allegations are “conclusory.” The 
audience doubts the inferential link between Facts B and C to Fact A, and thus 
labels their relationship as “conclusory.” The term conclusory will only arise in the 
context of pleadings, then, when the person reading the pleading disagrees with the 
factual inferences that the pleader believes are warranted. One person’s “warranted 
conclusion” is another’s “conclusory allegation.” Because the determination of 
whether certain facts follow from other facts is based on real-world experience and 
observation, it should come as no surprise that people will frequently disagree as to 
whether an inference is warranted or “conclusory.”235 
D. The Error of Iqbal’s “Conclusory” Interpretation of Twombly 
Using the working definitions established in the previous section, the problems 
stemming from Iqbal’s interpretation of Twombly, in which plausibility is triggered 
by the existence of “conclusory allegations,” become evident. There are three. First, 
the existence of conclusory allegations cannot rationally serve as a trigger for the 
plausibility analysis because the determinations as to whether an allegation is 
“conclusory” or “plausible” are analytically one in the same. Second, determining 
whether an allegation is sufficiently factually specific by asking whether that 
allegation is conclusory is fundamentally flawed because the two are not 
necessarily related. A conclusory allegation might be drafted with insufficient 
factual specificity, as was the case in Twombly. However, an allegation might be 
conclusory yet also be drafted with all possible factual specificity; this was true of 
the allegation of discriminatory intent in Iqbal. Asking whether an allegation is 
conclusory is thus a poor proxy for whether that allegation is factually specific. 
Third (and this is related to the second point), if plausibility is triggered merely by 
the existence of conclusory allegations, as Iqbal holds, this principle cannot be 
reconciled with Supreme Court precedent. The Court had never before suggested 
that the presence of conclusory allegations require an analysis of the plausibility of 
those allegations. In fact, in cases such as Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.,236 the Court 
had soundly affirmed that conclusory allegations are not problematic. The best 
interpretation of the Iqbal opinion is not that the Court intended to overrule cases 
such as Swierkiewicz, but rather that the Court was bewildered by the nebulous 
Twombly opinion. Once the chaos from the Twombly opinion is resolved (and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 235. See Kevin Jon Heller, The Cognitive Psychology of Circumstantial Evidence, 105 
MICH. L. REV. 241, 243 (2006) (explaining that in evaluating the weight to be given 
circumstantial evidence “the jury must use its experience with people and events in weighing 
the probabilities”). Professor Heller makes the interesting empirical point that both 
testimonial and circumstantial evidence require the jury to rely on their own experiences in 
determining how much weight should be given to that evidence, but that jurors consistently 
undervalue circumstantial evidence and overvalue testimonial evidence. See id. at 244. The 
Twombly and Iqbal opinions seem to share the bias discussed by Professor Heller. 
 236. 534 U.S. 506 (2002). 
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hopefully this Article contributes to that effort), the Court will turn its back on the 
Iqbal decision. 
1. Plausibility and Conclusory: A Circular Problem 
The first problem with using the existence of conclusory allegations as a trigger 
for the plausibility analysis is that, within the context of pleadings, the 
determination that an allegation is conclusory is the same as the determination that 
the allegation is not plausible. In other words, to say that an allegation is 
conclusory is not analytically different than saying that the allegation is not 
plausible, at least in the manner the term “plausibility” was used in both Twombly 
and Iqbal. Both terms reflect the same concept, which is that the reader doubts the 
actual occurrence of an event that the pleader has inferred from other facts.237 To 
use one as a trigger for the other is redundant or circular. 
To demonstrate, consider the Twombly facts. According to the Iqbal Court, the 
allegation of conspiracy in the Twombly complaint was conclusory.238 Using the 
definitional framework outlined above, the Court thus interpreted the allegation of 
a conspiracy to be a factual statement that the plaintiffs had inferred from the 
existence of other, directly observable facts. To attach the pejorative “conclusory” 
label to this allegation, however, it was necessary for the Court to make a judgment 
as to whether it believed the factual allegation of conspiracy followed from the 
directly perceived instances of parallel conduct. The Court did not. As detailed 
above, the allegation of a conspiracy in Twombly would not have been 
“conclusory” if the Court believed that conspiracy followed from parallel behavior. 
The plausibility analysis, however, retraces this same pattern of thinking. Earlier 
in this Article, I closely examined the Court’s plausibility analysis in Twombly.239 It 
was determined that, in conducting the plausibility analysis in Twombly, the Court 
was considering whether the allegations of parallel conduct implied a conspiracy.240 
The Iqbal decision falls into the same pattern. In Iqbal, the Court determined 
that the plaintiffs’ allegations of discriminatory intent were “conclusory.”241 The 
Court did not explicitly explain why these allegations were conclusory.242 
                                                                                                                 
 
 237. According to this author’s perception of how the two terms are commonly used, 
they might be slightly different (on a quantitative level) in the level of doubt that they serve 
to indicate. For instance, a reader might believe an allegation is “conclusory” yet also 
“plausible.” It is not that there is any qualitative difference in the analysis required to reach 
those separate conclusions; rather, it is that the term “conclusory” is used to indicate general 
doubt about the inference being considered while the term “implausible” is reserved only for 
those inferences which are highly unlikely. Thus, if a reader believed that an inference 
contained in an allegation was forty percent likely, he might label it “conclusory” yet also 
“plausible.” However, if the reader believed the inferential allegation only five percent 
likely, it might be both “conclusory” and “implausible.” Even if there is a slight quantitative 
difference between the terms, however, they still represent the same kind of analytical 
process and it is illogical for one to serve as the “trigger” for the other. 
 238. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949–50 (2009). 
 239. See supra text accompanying notes 145–65. 
 240. See supra text accompanying notes 147–48. 
 241. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951. 
 242. Id. 
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However, the clear inference which can be drawn from the opinion is that the Iqbal 
Court found the allegations of discriminatory intent to be conclusory because the 
plaintiff had not directly observed this fact, and the Court doubted that the fact 
could be inferred by the directly perceivable facts contained in the Iqbal complaint. 
Simply stated, the Court doubted that the defendants’ discriminatory intent could 
be inferred from the fact that a high proportion of Arabs and Muslims had been 
involved in the investigative roundup after the 9/11 tragedy. But, the plausibility 
analysis involved the same analytical inquiry of determining whether certain facts 
could be inferred from others.  
To state that a conclusory allegation triggers the plausibility analysis, then, is 
akin to saying that the defendant’s negligent behavior triggers an analysis of 
whether the defendant acted reasonably. The reasoning is circular. 
There is a response to this problem. Although I think the definition given to the 
word “conclusory” in this Article is consistent with how that term is generally used 
within legal jargon, it is possible that the Court intended something slightly 
different when it used the term in Twombly and Iqbal. In equating the allegations of 
discriminatory intent in Iqbal to the allegations of a conspiracy in Twombly, the 
Court most likely intended to stress that each allegation was based not on the 
events that had been directly perceived but rather on inferences from events that 
had been directly perceived. Thus, in Twombly, the plaintiffs had not directly 
perceived the conspiracy event on which the defendants’ liability was premised, but 
they had inferred that such an event had actually occurred because of inferences the 
plaintiffs had drawn from the directly perceived parallel conduct. Similarly, in 
Iqbal, the plaintiffs sought to infer the defendants’ discriminatory intent from the 
directly perceived real-world event involving the post-9/11 investigation and the 
proportion of Arabs and Muslims who had been detained in this process. In both 
Twombly and Iqbal, then, the critical allegation followed a certain pattern, which 
was that the alleged conduct of the defendant had not been directly perceived but 
instead had been inferred by the plaintiffs because of other facts.243 Using the three-
step definition of a “conclusory factual allegation” described above, the allegations 
in both Twombly and Iqbal were (1) factual assertions that were (2) based on 
inferences from other facts. Excluding the third part of the definition of 
“conclusory” explained above—that the reader doubts the inference asserted by the 
pleader—solves the circular problem that arises when conclusory allegations 
trigger the plausibility analysis. Under this massaged definition of “conclusory,” 
then, the plausibility analysis is triggered by the existence of factual assertions that 
are based on inferences rather than on directly perceived events. The Court then 
evaluated the inferences made by the complaint; those that the Court finds 
convincing are labeled “plausible” while those that are unconvincing are labeled 
“conclusory.” 
                                                                                                                 
 
 243. Commentator Stephen Brown, in his insightful article, Reconstructing Pleading: 
Twombly, Iqbal, and the Limited Role of the Plausibility Inquiry, advocates for a definition 
of conclusory that is very similar to the massaged version discussed in the text. See Brown, 
supra note 6, at 1288–92 (determining that conclusory allegations are allegations about an 
event that is only indirectly perceptible or an event that is directly perceptible but pleaded 
indirectly). 
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2. The Disconnect Between Conclusory Allegations and Factually Specific 
Allegations 
Although the “circular” problem discussed above can be resolved by massaging 
the term “conclusory” in a way that departs from its commonly used meaning, 
problems that are more fundamental exist if the plausibility analysis is triggered 
merely by the presence of conclusory allegations. The first of these problems is that 
there is no necessary correlation between an allegation that is conclusory and an 
allegation that is factually specific. To use one as a measure (or proxy) for the 
other, then, is an analytically flawed approach. As the adage goes: “To get a correct 
answer you have to ask the right question.” The Iqbal approach, in which the 
factual specificity question is answered by asking whether an allegation is 
conclusory, is destined to sometimes give the wrong answer because it asks the 
wrong question. 
The Twombly and Iqbal cases demonstrate that there is no necessary link 
between the factual specificity with which an allegation is made and whether that 
allegation is “conclusory.” In Twombly, the complaint alleged that an agreement or 
conspiracy had occurred based on the circumstantial evidence of parallel business 
behavior.244 Because the allegation of conspiracy in Twombly was asserted based 
on the existence of other facts (the parallel business behavior), it fits under the 
massaged definition of a conclusory factual allegation discussed in the previous 
Section. In addition to being conclusory, the allegation of conspiracy in Twombly 
was not as factually specific as it could have been. It was possible to describe the 
agreement or conspiracy with more factual detail, and a hypothetical complaint 
with this degree of factual specificity was discussed earlier in this Article. Thus, the 
allegation in Twombly was both conclusory and lacking in factual specificity. 
The allegation of discriminatory intent in Iqbal was conclusory in the same 
manner that the allegation of conspiracy in Twombly was conclusory. Like the 
conspiracy allegation in Twombly, the allegation of discriminatory intent involved 
in Iqbal was asserted by the plaintiffs based on the existence of other facts that the 
plaintiffs believed implied a discriminatory motive by the defendants, namely, the 
disproportionate number of Arabs and Muslims who had been involved with the 
federal government’s post-September 11th investigation.245 Although the 
problematic allegations in both Twombly and Iqbal qualify as conclusory factual 
allegations, they are different with regard to whether they were drafted with the 
requisite degree of factual specificity. Although the allegation of conspiracy in 
Twombly could have been drafted with more factual specificity, the allegation of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 244. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007) (“The nub of the 
complaint, then, is the [defendants’] parallel behavior . . . and its sufficiency turns on the 
suggestions raised by this conduct when viewed in light of common economic experience.”). 
 245. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951 (“The complaint alleges that ‘the FBI, under the 
direction of Defendant MUELLER, arrested and detained thousands of Arab Muslim 
men . . . as part of its investigation of the events of September 11.’ It further claims that ‘the 
policy of holding post-September-11th detainees in highly restrictive conditions of 
confinement until they were “cleared” by the FBI was approved by Defendants ASHCROFT 
and MUELLER in discussions in the weeks after September 11, 2001.’” (capitalization in 
original)). 
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discriminatory intent in Iqbal could not have been drafted with any more precision. 
A person’s state of mind (including a discriminatory intent) is definitely a factual 
question,246 but it is not an “event or transaction” and cannot be described any more 
specifically (absent a ridiculous discussion of brain neurons, synapses, and 
endorphins) other than to say that the state of mind does, or does not, exist. It is a 
reason or explanation for a real-world phenomenon, and in this sense is a species of 
causation inquiry,247 but it is not something susceptible to precise description.248 
The allegation of agreement or conspiracy in Twombly was also about a particular 
state of mind, but because humans cannot communicate other than by external, 
physical acts,249 the agreement or conspiracy amongst the defendants required real-
world events or transactions. 
Thus, Iqbal’s focus on the existence of conclusory allegations is analytically 
flawed because this inquiry does not address the fundamental question of whether 
the complaint has been drafted with sufficient factual specificity. This analytical 
flaw, however, is not just a theoretical problem—it creates serious tension with 
Supreme Court precedent. In fact, the Court’s treatment of the conclusory 
allegations in Iqbal simply cannot be reconciled with Court precedent previously 
considering conclusory allegations of discriminatory intent.  
3. Conclusory Allegations and Supreme Court Precedent 
Although Iqbal’s “conclusory” interpretation of Twombly would suggest that the 
mere presence of conclusory allegations triggers the plausibility analysis, the Court 
has never before indicated that a complaint’s inclusion of conclusory allegations is 
problematic. In fact, in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A. (decided only seven years 
prior to Iqbal), the Court specifically addressed a challenge to a conclusory 
allegation of discriminatory intent, indistinguishable from the one asserted in Iqbal, 
and concluded that the allegation was sufficient regardless of whether the district 
court believed the allegation was likely to be “plausible” or true.250 
                                                                                                                 
 
 246. See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982) (“Treating issues of intent 
as factual matters for the trier of fact is commonplace.”). 
 247. See Stephen J. Morse, Crazy Reasons, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 189, 190–92 
(1999) (“Intentional human conduct . . . unlike other phenomena, can be explained by . . . 
reasons for action. Although physical causes explain the movements of galaxies and planets, 
molecules, infrahuman species, and all the other moving parts of the physical universe, only 
human action can also be explained by reasons. It makes no sense to ask a bull that gores a 
matador, ‘Why did you do that?,’ but this question makes sense and is vitally important 
when it is addressed to a person who sticks a knife into the chest of another human being. It 
makes a great difference to us if the knife-wielder is a surgeon who is cutting with the 
patient’s consent or a person who is enraged at the victim and intends to kill him.”). 
 248. The drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure seemed to understand that a 
person’s state of mind is not susceptible to a more particular description when they excluded 
“conditions of a person’s mind” from the heightened particularity requirements of Rule 9. 
See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
 249. See Daryl J. Bem & Charles Honorton, Does Psi Exist? Replicable Evidence for an 
Anomalous Process of Information Transfer, 115 PSYCHOL. BULL., no. 1, 1994 at 4–18 
(describing general scientific doubt regarding “ESP”). 
 250. See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. 506 (2002). 
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In Swierkiewicz, a plaintiff sued his employer under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 alleging that he had been fired on account of his national origin.251 The 
district court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the plaintiff “had not 
adequately alleged circumstances that support an inference of discrimination.”252 
This decision was affirmed by the Second Circuit under circuit precedent holding 
that, in order to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege the facts that he 
will ultimately have to provide evidence of after the discovery stage in order to 
avoid summary judgment.253 The Supreme Court reversed the “Court of Appeals’ 
heightened pleading standard” in a unanimous opinion.254 The Court confirmed the 
notice test for the factual specificity requirement announced in Conley and 
explained that the complaint had met that requirement by detailing “the events 
leading to his termination.”255 Most importantly, the Court rejected the argument 
that the “conclusory allegation of discrimination” permitted the Court to affirm a 
dismissal based on the implausibility of the plaintiff’s allegation: “Indeed it may 
appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but 
that is not the test.”256 
There is no way to reconcile, as a matter of pleading standards, the Court’s 
approach to the “conclusory allegations of discrimination” in Swierkiewicz and 
Iqbal. Both involved conclusory allegations of discriminatory intent; in Iqbal, the 
Court dismissed these allegations as implausible while in Swierkiewicz the Court 
admonished the trial court for engaging in this same type of analysis. Many lower 
courts and commentators have determined that Iqbal overruled the Swierkiewicz 
case.257 This is a fair conclusion; the cases cannot be reconciled.  
The problem with this understanding of Iqbal, however, is that the Court never 
even mentioned Swierkiewicz in the Iqbal opinion. The Swierkiewicz decision 
(along with Twombly) was the most relevant precedent to the Iqbal litigation. 
Swierkiewicz was cited and discussed in the briefs submitted to the Court;258 yet, it 
is not even mentioned once in the Iqbal opinion.259 This is a curious way to 
overrule a case, if this is what the Court intended. And, although the Court has 
                                                                                                                 
 
 251. Id. at 508–09. 
 252. Id. at 509. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. at 514–15. 
 255. Id. at 514. 
 256. Id. at 515 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)). 
 257. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2009) (concluding that 
Swierkiewicz was overruled by Iqbal); Seiner, supra note 152, at 193 (concluding that there 
is “serious concern following Iqbal as to the validity of the Swierkiewicz decision,” and 
citing numerous authors who have reached the same conclusion); Thomas, supra note 3, at 
18 (explaining that “Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A. effectively may be dead”). But see 
Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404–06 (7th Cir. 2010) (concluding that the 
Swierkiewicz decision is still valid after Iqbal). 
 258. See Brief for Respondent Javaid Iqbal at v, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) 
(No. 07-1015) (citing to Swierkiewicz in “passim”); Brief for the Petitioners at VI, Ashcroft 
v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (No. 07-1015) (citing to Swierkiewicz four times in the 
brief). 
 259. See Swanson, 614 F.3d at 410 (noting that Swierkiewicz was not cited in the Iqbal 
opinion). 
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sometimes overruled previous cases in this passive manner, the usual course for the 
Court is to directly confront precedent that is in conflict with the approach of the 
Court in the case at bar.260 
There is a better descriptive account of what happened in Iqbal: The Iqbal Court 
did not mean to overrule Swierkiewicz, either directly or implicitly. Rather, the 
Court was simply puzzled as to how to reconcile the Twombly decision with the 
Swierkiewicz decision. The Twombly opinion, as discussed above, is written as if it 
is consistent with every pleading case that had previously been decided by the 
Court.261 And the Twombly opinion (unlike the Iqbal opinion) cites the 
Swierkiewicz decision as if both are compatible;262 it even explicitly dismisses the 
plaintiffs’ attempt to argue that the result in Twombly was inconsistent with 
Swierkiewicz.263 But the Iqbal Court could not sort out how to reconcile these two 
cases. 
Indeed, the results in Twombly and Swierkiewicz cannot be reconciled if the 
complaints in those cases are considered only from the perspective of whether they 
included “conclusory allegations.” Using the massaged definition of conclusory 
discussed above, the allegations in both Twombly and Swierkiewicz were 
conclusory in the sense that they inferred one fact from the existence of other facts. 
But Twombly’s allegation of an illegal antitrust conspiracy was determined to be 
implausible, while Swierkiewicz’s allegation of discriminatory intent was allowed 
to proceed to discovery. The Supreme Court even admonished the lower court in 
Swierkiewicz for suggesting that a complaint should be dismissed on the grounds 
that “recovery is very remote and unlikely.”264 
Thus, by adopting the “conclusory” reading of Twombly, the Iqbal Court painted 
itself into a corner. The allegation of discriminatory intent in Iqbal was 
“conclusory,” as that term has been massaged in this Article. The allegation of 
discriminatory intent in Swierkiewicz was also conclusory, as was the allegation of 
an illegal antitrust conspiracy in Twombly. But the Court treated the conclusory 
allegations in Swierkiewicz and Twombly dissimilarly. The Iqbal Court dealt with 
this quandary by ignoring Swierkiewicz, discussing Twombly, and then proceeding 
to the plausibility analysis. 
If Twombly would have been interpreted according to the “transactional” 
approach discussed above, however, the Iqbal Court would not have been in the 
position of having to ignore either Twombly or Swierkiewicz. Under this reading of 
Twombly, the Twombly and Swierkiewicz decisions can be reconciled; the resort to 
plausibility in Twombly was necessary because the complaint failed to provide a 
minimal amount of factual detail as to the transaction or event on which the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 260. See Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory 
Interpretation Methodology, 96 GEO. L.J. 1863, 1875 (2008) (explaining that when the Court 
overrules prior precedent the “norm is to conduct such doctrinal analysis explicitly” rather 
than overruling the opinions “sub silentio”).  
 261. See supra text accompanying notes 142–44. 
 262. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 563 (2007) (citing Swierkiewicz 
v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002)). 
 263. Id. 569–70. 
 264. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002) (quoting Scheuer v. 
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)). 
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liability of the defendant was premised. The complaint in Swierkiewicz, however, is 
materially different than the Twombly complaint under this metric. As the Court 
noted in Swierkiewicz, the complaint in that case provided the basic details of the 
event that formed the basis of the plaintiff’s complaint.265 
Had the Court adopted the transactional reading of Twombly, then, it would not 
have even reached the plausibility analysis in Iqbal. Because the allegation of 
discriminatory intent in Iqbal, like the allegation of discriminatory intent in 
Swierkiewicz, was made with all possible factual specificity, the Court would have 
permitted the Iqbal plaintiffs to proceed to discovery like the plaintiffs in 
Swierkiewicz. The “transactional” reading of Twombly, then, not only reconciles 
Swierkiewicz with Twombly but also would have prevented the plausibility analysis 
in Iqbal, thus avoiding the inconsistent results in Iqbal and Swierkiewicz. 
Of course, this is not what occurred in Iqbal. The Iqbal Court clearly considered 
Twombly’s “conclusory” allegations to be the impetus for the plausibility analysis 
in that case.266 And because the Iqbal case also involved conclusory allegations, the 
Court proceeded to plausibility in Iqbal267 despite the inconsistency of this result 
with Swierkiewicz. 
Going forward, the challenge is to sort out how this jumbled mess will, and 
should, be resolved. The best, and easiest, fix to this problem is for the Iqbal case 
to be overruled and for Twombly to be read according to the “transactional” method 
discussed above. 
First, reading Twombly according to the transactional theory discussed above is 
both historically and analytically sound. As recounted earlier in this Article, civil 
complaints in the United States have long been subject to a standard of factual 
specificity.268 Reading Twombly as a case about factual specificity incorporates that 
case into this history. Adopting the transactional understanding of Twombly 
introduces a method for measuring factual specificity which is consistent with the 
overall thrust of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (which lean heavily on the 
notion of a “transaction” or “occurrence”269) and which is analytically sound in the 
sense that it accurately measures the factor under consideration. 
Furthermore, from the perspective of Supreme Court precedent, it is a much 
easier task to overrule the Iqbal decision than it would be to overrule the 
Swierkiewicz decision. The Swierkiewicz decision cannot be easily isolated. If the 
plausibility analysis is required every time there is a “conclusory” factual allegation 
(under the assumed definition given to that term in order to avoid the circular 
problem discussed above), the plausibility analysis would be necessary in every 
case in which the defendant’s liability depends upon the subjective intent of the 
defendant. As discussed above, a defendant’s state of mind is a fact that can only be 
                                                                                                                 
 
 265. Id. at 514 (“Applying the relevant standard, petitioner’s complaint easily satisfied 
the requirements of Rule 8(a) because it gives respondent fair notice of the basis for 
petitioner’s claims. . . . His complaint detailed the events leading to his termination, provided 
relevant dates, and included the ages and nationalities of at least some of the relevant persons 
involved with his termination.”). 
 266. See supra text accompanying notes 184–96. 
 267. Id. 
 268. See supra text accompanying notes 35–57. 
 269. See supra text accompanying notes 168–78. 
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alleged by inference to other directly perceivable facts. Thousands, probably 
millions, of complaints have been filed in federal court which rest on this premise. 
Surely the Twombly Court did not mean to suggest that these complaints had been 
incorrectly analyzed for all these decades if the plausibility of those allegations of 
discriminatory intent were not considered by the district courts. This would be a 
dramatic shift in pleading jurisprudence, and I am reluctant to believe that the 
Court intended such a seismic shift.270  
It is somewhat ironic that the Supreme Court’s initial pronouncement on the 
pleading standards required for Rule 8, Conley v. Gibson, also involved an 
allegation of discriminatory intent.271 Indeed, the factual specificity challenge made 
to the complaint in Conley centered on the allegations of discriminatory intent 
which were included in the complaint: “The [defendants] also argue that the 
complaint failed to set forth specific facts to support its general allegations of 
discrimination and that its dismissal is therefore proper.”272 The Conley Court 
rejected this argument, and there is no indication that this decision was based on an 
analysis of the plausibility of the discrimination allegations made in the complaint. 
The Iqbal decision is not only inconsistent with Swierkiewicz; it runs afoul of 
pleading cases that extend all the way back to Conley v. Gibson. 
Overruling Iqbal is thus the much easier route by which to achieve consistency 
within the Supreme Court’s case law. Moreover, there is no convincing argument 
that the Iqbal Court’s interpretation of Rule 8 is superior to that represented in 
previous Supreme Court case law. If the costs associated with litigation have 
changed in the decades since the adoption of the Federal Rules, thus requiring a 
reworking of the approach to pleading and discovery, the appropriate course for the 
Court to take is a formal amendment to the Rules.273 The Rules Enabling Act gives 
the Supreme Court the power “to prescribe general rules of practice and 
procedure”274 and establishes a formal process for doing so.275 The Act does not, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 270. Professor Marcus has previously expressed similar views regarding lower federal 
court opinions which seem to anticipate the Supreme Court’s Iqbal decision: 
The difficulties with scrutinizing factual conclusions become manifest in 
connection with the frequent demand that the plaintiff proffer sufficient 
supporting evidence to make conclusory [factual] allegations, particularly those 
relating to state of mind, credible. In these cases . . . the court is not 
affirmatively concluding that plaintiff’s charges are false, but only that they are 
unsupported. Although the desire to insist on some underlying evidence is 
natural, that exercise is materially different from the substantive scrutiny 
described above. Requiring plaintiff to proffer supporting evidence at the 
pleadings stage cannot be justified for several reasons. 
Marcus, supra note 46, at 467–68 (footnote omitted). 
 271. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 43 (1957). 
 272. Id. at 47. 
 273. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 861 (1999) (“[W]e are bound to follow 
Rule 23 as we understood it upon its adoption, and . . . we are not free to alter it except 
through the process prescribed by Congress in the Rules Enabling Act.”); Amchem Prods., 
Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997) (“The text of a rule thus proposed and reviewed 
limits judicial inventiveness. Courts are not free to amend a rule outside of the process 
Congress ordered . . . .”). 
 274. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2006). 
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however, give the Supreme Court the power to amend pleading practice “on the 
fly” through judicial interpretation.276  
E. The Irony of Conley (Properly Understood) and Iqbal 
In the previous Part, it was noted that there is some irony to the fact that both 
Iqbal and Conley involved allegations of discriminatory intent. I believe the irony 
extends beyond the inconsistent treatment those allegations received at the 
Supreme Court in those two cases. In Conley, the Court did not inquire whether the 
allegation of discriminatory intent was plausible; in fact, the best interpretation of 
the Conley opinion is that the Court thought the allegation of discriminatory intent 
in the complaint was completely unnecessary. 
Recall the conclusion reached earlier in this Article that Conley’s “no set of 
facts” language anticipates that a complaint might be ambiguous regarding certain 
facts that a plaintiff might ultimately have to prove at trial in order to recover from 
the defendant, and that this ambiguity (or absence) is not fatal to the complaint.277 
The “no set of facts” language directs a judge that she is to “fill the gaps” in the 
story in a manner that is favorable to the plaintiff. If the notice standard for factual 
specificity requires a defendant to give the “who, what, when, and where” 
regarding the events or transactions on which the defendants’ liability is premised, 
the Conley “no set of facts” language applies to facts that are not part of the “event 
or transaction” of the suit but must nevertheless be proven at trial for a recovery to 
occur. An allegation of a defendant’s mental state (such as a defendant’s 
discriminatory intent) fits this description. A defendant’s mental state is a fact 
question which will often be necessary for recovery, but it is not an “event or 
transaction” falling under the transactional definition of “notice” developed in this 
article. It is something that is internal to the defendant. As such, Conley can be read 
for the proposition that an allegation of discriminatory intent (such as that involved 
in cases such as Conley, Swierkiewicz, and Twombly) need not even be included in 
a complaint to comply with the requirements of Rule 8. 
I am not the only one who has reached this conclusion. In his notable book Civil 
Procedure of the Trial Court in Historical Perspective Professor Robert Millar 
engages in an enlightening discussion on whether the Federal Rules require a 
factual allegation on each element of a cause of action.278 Professor Millar 
eventually concludes that the best interpretation of the Rules is that it is 
unnecessary to allege all of the elements of a cause of action so long as notice is 
adequately given.279 In discussing the type of factual allegation which might be 
omitted from a complaint but nevertheless satisfies the notice standard of factual 
specificity, Professor Millar gives the example of a suit based on a dog-bite 
incident in which the underlying substantive law requires that the plaintiff prove 
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 276. See Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of “General Rules,” 2009 
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that the defendant had knowledge of the dog’s propensity to bite.280 Professor 
Millar concludes: “[I]f the third element, that of scienter, is omitted, is not the 
defendant, nevertheless, reasonably informed of the nature of the claim?”281  
Professor Millar might just as well have been referring to the Iqbal case.  
When the Supreme Court pronounced the “no set of facts” language in Conley, I 
believe the Court was writing from a perspective similar to Professor Millar’s. Of 
course, Conley’s “no set of facts” language was “retired” in Twombly.282 My point 
here, though, is not to argue that a plaintiff be allowed to proceed without even 
alleging factual matters such as the defendants’ illegal scienter, even if that is the 
best interpretation of the Conley opinion. Instead, my point here is to demonstrate 
what a dramatic shift the Iqbal approach would be if it were to be controlling in the 
future. Moving from a view that a plaintiff need not even allege discriminatory 
intent to a view that a plaintiff must allege discriminatory intent, allege the 
circumstantial evidence on which that conclusion is based, and convince a court 
that this inferential evidence is “plausible” is extraordinary considering that these 
interpretations are based on the exact same text of Rule 8. 
F. Professor Steinman’s Effort to Justify Iqbal’s Interpretation of Twombly 
Professor Steinman, in his article Plain Pleading, seems to implicitly understand 
that there are problems with the Iqbal Court’s reliance on the existence of 
conclusory allegations as the trigger for the plausibility analysis. Professor 
Steinman attempts to avoid these difficulties by defining “conclusory” consistent 
with the “transactional” theory of factual specificity advanced here.283 I doubt that 
the term can be so stretched. This Article attempts to define “conclusory” as it is 
commonly understood and used within legal circles. The heart of the concept is that 
one fact is inferred from another. This analysis is, at base, different than whether an 
event or transaction has been described with sufficient factual detail, as explained 
above. The term “conclusory” simply has too much baggage for it to be employed 
in the manner that Professor Steinman suggests. Attempting to resolve the problem 
through word play will simply exacerbate the confusion that exists with regard to 
pleading. 
Apart from this problem of nomenclature (and probably in part because of this 
problem), I believe that Professor Steinman also errs in explaining Iqbal as a case 
that fails the “transactional” trigger for plausibility. According to Professor 
Steinman: “The problem [in Iqbal] is not the cursory allegation of discriminatory 
animus. The problem is the murkiness surrounding what Ashcroft and Mueller 
actually did vis-à-vis Iqbal.”284 This reading of Iqbal is incorrect. 
The complaint in Iqbal was specific about the transaction on which the 
defendants’ liability was premised. As part of its post-9/11 investigation, the FBI 
arrested thousands of Arab Muslim men.285 The plaintiff was one of them.286 Many 
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of these men (including the plaintiff) were designated as being of “high interest” to 
the government investigation.287 Once these men were designated as being of “high 
interest,” they were subject to a formal policy that required that they be held in 
highly restrictive conditions of confinement until they were “cleared.”288 This 
formal policy was cleared by defendants Ashcroft and Mueller “in discussions in 
the weeks after September 11, 2001.”289 The complaint alleged that the defendants 
had approved this policy because of a discriminatory purpose.290 
Granted, parsing this story from the numerous factual allegations contained in 
the complaint requires some work, and maybe the complaint was not written as 
succinctly as it could have been in order to avoid “murkiness.” The complaint, 
however, was a vehicle by which multiple claims were asserted against, and by, 
multiple parties.291 There was more at stake in the litigation than simply the claims 
against Ashcroft and Mueller considered by the Supreme Court in the Iqbal 
opinion. Because of the complex nature of the litigation, it is perhaps not surprising 
that the narrative was not always chronological, a fact that seems to trouble 
Professor Steinman.292 
In any event, the Supreme Court has never adopted the position that an inartfully 
drawn complaint should be dismissed for “murkiness.”293 The proper question is 
whether the facts have been told with sufficient specificity. On this issue, 
particularly if one assumes a transactional understanding of the factual specificity 
required in a complaint, the Iqbal complaint was adequate. The circumstances 
surrounding the plaintiff’s arrest and imprisonment were told in great detail.294 The 
policy in which persons designated as “high interest” were held in restrictive 
conditions of confinement was explained.295 The only part of this transactional 
story arguably lacking in factual specificity was the factual allegation that Ashcroft 
and Mueller had agreed to the restrictive confinement policy “in discussions in the 
weeks after September 11, 2001.”296 But even here the complaint was much more 
specific about Ashcroft and Mueller’s involvement in the restrictive confinement 
policy than were the allegations in Twombly. Ashcroft and Mueller were 
specifically identified; the manner in which this policy was adopted was identified 
(“discussions”); and a very narrow time period (“weeks after September 11, 2001”) 
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was identified. The Iqbal complaint was much more specific about Ashcroft and 
Mueller’s involvement in the restrictive confinement policy than was Twombly’s 
allegation of conspiracy, which did not detail how the alleged agreement was 
reached, where it was done, by whom, and when. 
Even more telling, however, was the focus of the plausibility analysis in Iqbal. 
In Twombly, the allegation of agreement was not told with specificity, and the 
Court proceeded to see if the circumstantial evidence “plausibly” suggested that an 
agreement had occurred. In Iqbal, however, the Court did not consider whether 
Ashcroft and Mueller had “plausibly” been involved with the adoption of the 
restrictive confinement policy. Rather, the plausibility analysis was focused 
specifically on whether Ashcroft and Mueller’s alleged involvement with the 
restrictive confinement was based on discrimination: 
To prevail . . . the complaint must contain facts plausibly showing that 
petitioners purposefully adopted a policy of classifying post-
September-11 detainees as “of high interest” because of their race, 
religion, or national origin. . . . This the complaint fails to do. . . . [T]he 
complaint does not show, or even intimate, that petitioners purposefully 
housed detainees [in highly restrictive conditions] due to their race, 
religion, or national origin. All it plausibly suggests is that the Nation’s 
top law enforcement officers, in the aftermath of a devastating terrorist 
attack, sought to keep suspected terrorists in the most secure conditions 
available until the suspects could be cleared of terrorist activity.297 
If the Court had been concerned about the “murkiness surrounding what 
Ashcroft and Mueller actually did vis-à-vis Iqbal,”298 as Professor Steinman 
suggests, the plausibility analysis would have been applied to this question. Instead, 
the plausibility analysis was applied to the question of the defendants’ 
discriminatory intent. Reading Iqbal in such a way that the problem is “not the 
cursory allegation of discriminatory animus”299 is a nice way to minimize the Iqbal 
decision and make it consistent with Swierkiewicz, but it is not faithful to the 
analysis and language of the Iqbal opinion.  
CONCLUSION 
The Twombly and Iqbal cases have mostly been treated as a cohesive pair by 
commentators and courts, but these two cases have divergent futures. Twombly will 
eventually be recognized as a valuable case. The Twombly case, properly 
understood, clarifies the factual specificity standard under Rule 8 and instructs 
lower courts how to proceed when this standard is not met. Iqbal, however, will go 
down as a hiccup. Perhaps it will be explained away on nonpleading grounds.300 Or, 
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perhaps it will be directly overruled. Regardless of the exact method of its 
expiration, though, its shelf life is limited unless the Federal Rules are dramatically 
rewritten or cases interpreting the Rules are overruled. There is no indication, 
however, that the Supreme Court truly intended to signal this dramatic shift in 
Iqbal. The better interpretation of Iqbal is that the Court was simply confused as to 
what had occurred in Twombly. Once this confusion is sorted out, however, the 
Court will turn its back on the Iqbal decision. 
                                                                                                                 
emergency unprecedented in the history of the American Republic’”). 
       
